

AN EXISTENTIAL CRISIS:
THE STATE AND FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

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ABSTRACT

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For more than a half century, the European Union (EU) has contributed to unprecedented levels of peace and economic prosperity in Europe. Unfortunately, the success of the EU in these areas has been undervalued as the memory of World War II has faded. Additionally, there has been a significant rise in Euroscepticism over the past decade as the EU has fallen dramatically short of expectations when addressing the economic recession and debt crisis, the refugees crisis, and terrorism. These issues bring to light underlying weaknesses in the input legitimacy and output legitimacy of the EU. The challenges in achieving input legitimacy and output legitimacy has led the EU to a truly existential crisis, as many doubt if the EU can continue to survive in its current form. The future of the EU depends on some external factors beyond its control (the Russian threat, the global economy, the French and German elections, and the fate of the UK as it attempts to leave the EU), but its future also depends on the steps the EU takes to restore its input legitimacy and output legitimacy. First, the EU must take effective actions to show its value on a large and personal scale to restore its output legitimacy. Second, the EU must address underlying concerns of detachment, identity, and its purpose. Finally, the measures the EU takes to restore its output legitimacy and build its input legitimacy must be effectively and accurately communicated to the people.

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CHAPTER 1: THE EXISTENTIAL CRISIS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

In March of 2017, the European Commission, the executive arm of the European Union (EU), published a white paper on the Future of Europe. For the first time in its history, the European Union expressed uncertainty about its future. The meaning, purpose, and value of the EU are all being questioned at unprecedented levels, such that its very existence is being challenged. For many, the possibility that the European Union will disband is becoming ever more possible. Those who are optimistic about the European Union maintain hope that the European Union will resolve its existential crisis by finding new strength from unity and promoting further integration. While the future of the EU is far from clear, it is undeniable that something must change for the EU as it truly is in an existential crisis.

The existential crisis of the European Union is largely due to a decrease in its perceived legitimacy by the people and member states it governs (see Appendix 8). Democratic governments, such as the European Union, rely on the people recognizing the government's legitimacy, which is defined as "the people's recognition and acceptance of the validity of the rules of their entire political system and the decisions of their rulers." Legitimacy can be broken down into input legitimacy and output legitimacy. Input legitimacy is based on the process in which rules are adopted. A democratic governing body possesses input legitimacy if its process is generally viewed as fair and representative of the people. The second form of legitimacy is output legitimacy, which is based on the impact and effectiveness of the rules and policies the governing body implements. A

government has output legitimacy if it is viewed as being effective in creating and enforcing laws that ultimately benefit society.¹

First, it is necessary to address the increasing doubt about the input legitimacy of the EU. The EU was founded after World War II under the idea that increased economic integration would lead to peace and solidarity within Europe. By most regards, the EU has succeeded at facilitating economic integration and promoting peace within Europe. In fact, the EU seems to have become a victim of its own success because the longstanding peace seems to have caused many to doubt the necessity of the EU. As the memory of World War II has faded, the narrative of the necessity of the EU for peace within Europe has lost power. The idea of war within Europe seems almost unimaginable for those who never experienced World War II, such that the necessity of the EU for peace seems almost absurd. As a result, the reason and necessity for the existence of the EU is unclear. Today, some appear to see the EU as an economic entity, whereas others view the EU in ideological terms as a champion for European values, and others simply view the EU as a vehicle for free movement in Europe.² There is no common understanding of the purpose of the EU, and the original justification of promoting peace seems largely lost. Moreover, a sense of European identity comes second to national identity, which creates an obstacle for European integration through the European Union and the lack of a common European identity weakens feelings of solidarity between member states. National identities have been prioritized throughout history with stories of national history and heroes; furthermore, national education, which prioritizes the history of the specific state over a

¹ Weiler, Joseph H. H. "In the Face of Crisis: Input Legitimacy, Output Legitimacy and the Political Messianism

² European Commission. *Standard Eurobarometer 85- Spring 2015- Public opinion in the European Union*. May 2016. Accessed January 27, 2017.

common European history, also contributes to national identities having a greater strength than a common European identity. Finally, there is a high degree of detachment between the European Union and the European citizens it serves. This sense of detachment is due partly to a democratic deficit in the structure of the EU, but largely related to an emotional detachment stemming from a perception that the technocratic officials of the EU are removed from the problems of a common European. All of these factors cause the EU to have low levels of input legitimacy.

Not only is the EU suffering from doubt about its input legitimacy, but it also suffers from high levels of doubt about its output legitimacy. People no longer believe that the EU has the ability to deliver results to make their lives better, as it has failed to effectively respond to key issues that have arisen in Europe over the past decade. Economic concerns due to the 2008 financial crisis and the resulting European debt crisis initially sparked concerns that have only grown as the recovery progressed at a slower pace than desired. Moreover, the recent refugee crisis in Europe has raised concerns about migration to and within Europe. Finally, the increasing frequency of terrorist attacks on European soil has raised fears over security and open borders. To date, the European Union has failed to effectively respond to these crises effectively and in a way that resonates with European citizens, causing its output legitimacy to fall under a high degree of scrutiny. When the EU does succeed at creating laws to respond to issues, the EU has difficulty enforcing these laws as enforcement depends on member states. Even when the EU succeeds at creating and enforcing laws to solve problems, it rarely gets credit for its successes as it has limited communication channels with European citizens. Compounding this is the fact that national governments fail to give the EU credit for its successes when

they can claim success for themselves. As a result, the EU has low levels of actual and perceived output legitimacy.

Combined, these sentiments on the input and output legitimacy of the EU have led to dramatic increases in Euroscepticism in recent years. Euroscepticism is generally known as “the opposition and doubt to the process of European integration,” largely with reference to the European Union itself.³ Euroscepticism has existed for the history of the EU, but is has escalated over the past decade due to the aforementioned events, as well as the advancement and spread of technology which facilitates the dissemination of minority, extremist, or anti-establishment views.⁴ In fact, there are two distinct branches of Euroscepticism. The first of which is “hard” Euroscepticism, which consists of “a principled opposition to the EU and European integration and therefore can be seen in parties who think that their counties should withdraw from membership, or whose policies towards the EU are tantamount to being opposed to the whole project of European integration as it is currently conceived.”⁵ This branch of Euroscepticism, which the French National Front party largely champions, is the most concerning for the EU; but, “soft” Euroscepticism can also be threatening as it has the potential to spread and transform into hard Euroscepticism. Soft Euroscepticism is “not a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas lead to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU, or where there is a sense that ‘national

³ Taggart, P. (1998). “A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary W

⁴ Euroscepticism can be seen through the context of a global increase in anti-establishment views. The European Union can be seen as the “establishment” composed of the political elite who can be viewed as disconnected from the common man. As a result, as anti-establishment views spread, they can fuel Eurosceptic sentiments.

⁵ Taggart P.; Szczerbiakk, A. (2002). “The Party Politics of Euroscepticism in EU Member and Candidate States”, ‘Opposing Europe Research Network’ Working Paper, No.6, pp. 1-45.

interest' is currently at odds with the EU's trajectory."⁶ While these are two distinct beliefs, both fall under the umbrella term of Euroscepticism and pose a danger to the EU, so they will be addressed simply as Euroscepticism.

Euroscepticism must also be viewed in the greater context of globalization. As the world becomes increasingly intertwined economically, there are winners and losers in the short term as markets adjust to align with efficiency. For many, this transition has led to an increase in nationalism, as other nations seem to pose a threat to the economic status quo of a country. Nationalism is becoming increasingly relevant when considering the European Union, as it can pose a threat to supranationalism (a governing body over individual nation states) if national interests conflict with the supranationalist agenda⁷. Nationalism holds that an "individual's loyalty and devotion to the nation-state surpass all other groups or interests."⁸ This implies that a state must have primary identification with its people. Nationalism is based on an in-group versus out-group mentality, which makes integration impossible unless all parties identify as members of the same group above all other groups. This analysis is rooted in Tajfel's Social Identity Theory, which states that the "in-group will discriminate against the out-group to enhance their self-image."⁹ Once an identity is established that identifies the nation as the in-group, then individuals (and, by extension the government through democratic processes) will prioritize the state above other European states, such that other European states will be viewed as threats,

⁶ Taggart P.; Szczerbiak, A. (2002).

⁷ Nationalism is not the same as Euroscepticism. It is possible to be both very in favor of nationalism and very in favor of the European, as Scotland tends to exhibit both of these traits. However, nationalism often coincides with Euroscepticism as national interests often come in conflict the supranationalist goals.

⁸ "Nationalism." Encyclopedia Britannica Online. Accessed November 27, 2016.

<https://www.britannica.com/topic/nationalism>.

⁹ McLeod, Saul. "Social Identity Theory." *Simply Psychology*, 2008. Accessed December 29, 2016.

<http://www.simplypsychology.org/social-identity-theory.html>

competition, or simply secondary. When the issues of that nation are perfectly aligned with the greater interests of Europe, this mindset may not be an issue. But, when the perceived interests of that nation are in conflict (or simply appear to be in conflict with the interests of Europe, as in a tragedy of the commons scenario), supranationalist efforts will be challenged, if not prevented, when nationalism takes hold. Nationalism is not necessarily synonymous with Euroscepticism. It is feasible that a country can be very pro-nationalist, but also in favor of European integration if it is viewed as benefiting the country; however, nationalism frequently aligns with Eurosceptic views as any other nation, even other European nations, can be viewed as economically threatening to the prosperity of the nation in question. Within Europe, these nationalist sentiments seem to be leading not only to anti-globalist views,¹⁰ but also largely to Eurosceptic views as other European nations, and by extension the European Union, may be viewed as a threat to national interests.

THEORIES OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

In order to fully understand the existential crisis of the EU, it is necessary to understand not only the Eurosceptic views and their reasons, but also to understand the process of European integration. There are five main theories that attempt to explain European integration: federalism, functionalism, neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism, and liberal governmentalism.

Federalism is perhaps the most extreme method of European integration, approaching integration as a way of ultimately combining sovereignty from individual states. It calls for a constitution under which previously independent actors fully integrate, similar to the model of states within the United States government. Federalism was quickly

viewed as too extreme as it would be a threat to national sovereignty, as European nations desired some degree of sovereignty.

Following the rejection of federalism, functionalism developed. Functionalism holds that as the world became more economically interconnected following the industrial revolution, the common interests of states triggered integration because the high degree of economic connection created problems that could only be resolved by means of inter-state or supranational cooperation.¹¹¹² David Mitrany was a prominent functionalist, who “advocated the creation of a range of similarly constituted technical and scientific agencies with potentially global reach to implement infrastructure and reconstruction programs, organized on a technical or functional basis rather than on a territorial basis.”¹³

Neofunctionalism, proposed by Ernst Haas in 1958 in his book The Uniting of Europe, rises from the basic beliefs of functionalism.¹⁴ Neofunctionalism builds on functionalism, arguing that limited integration from functionalism then creates pressures for further integration, as the socioeconomic problems of today’s world cannot be solved by individual states, rather they require solution enacted by all relevant parties, such that integration arises from functional necessity.¹⁵

In the context of the EU, neofunctionalism argues that the only way to effectively respond to the issues Europe is facing today would be at a supranational level through the EU, as individual nation states acting in a disjointed fashion would be utterly incapable of

¹¹ Arzheimer, Kai. *Theories of European Integration: EU Integration after Lisbon*. University of Mainz. Accessed November 27, 2016. <http://www.kai-arzheimer.com/Political-Integration-EU/eu-7-print.pdf>.

¹² Meyers, Reinhard. *Theories of European Integration I*. University of Muenster. Accessed November 27, 2016. <http://testpolitics.pbworks.com/w/page/25854032/Liberal%20Intergovernmentalism>

¹³ “Functionalism: International Relations.” Encyclopedia Britannica. Accessed December 1, 2016. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/functionalism-international-organizations>

¹⁴ Haas, Ernst B. *The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958.

¹⁵ Haas, Arzheimer, and Meyers.

responding to the issues effectively.¹⁶ Ernst Haas took this view, writing during the time when the European Coal and Steel Community became absorbed into the European Community. Haas pointed to this evolution, and argued that such a transition was evidence in favor of the creation of supranational entities as they had “power to redirect the loyalties and expectations of political actors.”¹⁷

Hoffman’s theory of intergovernmentalism, proposed in The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Politics,¹⁸ challenges Haas’s theory of neofunctionalism, opposing the idea that further integration is inevitable and necessary. Instead, intergovernmentalism argues that primary power lies with national governments as they gained legal sovereignty over their individual countries.¹⁹ Consequently, nations have much greater independence and sovereignty when viewed through the lens of intergovernmentalism, such that integration will and should only happen to the degree that national governments desire it to occur.²⁰

Moravcsik built on the initial theory of intergovernmentalism in his book The Choice for Europe,²¹ where he proposed an the theory of liberal intergovernmentalism, in which there is no entity superior to the state.²² He argued that states entered into international negotiations largely guided by their individual economic interests, and that states will only allow integration if it yields economic benefits while still supporting the political survival of

¹⁶ Meyers

¹⁷ Haas, Ernst.

¹⁸ Hoffman, Stanley. *The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of International Politic*. 1965.

¹⁹ Hoffman.

²⁰ Arzheimer, Meyers, and “Liberal Intergovernmentalism”

²¹ Moravcsik, Andrew. *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998.

²² Moravcsik, A., Schimmelfennig, F. (2009) *Liberal Intergovernmentalism*. In: Diez, T., Wiener, A., (2009) *European Integration Theory*, Oxford: Oxford University Press pp. 67 - 87

the individual state.²³ Other benefits might also factor into the analysis, but Moravcsik believed that economic interest were of paramount concern for states. Given asymmetries of information and power, Moravcsik also argued that “negotiations would imitate the power of the states taking part, and that states allowing supranational bodies to make decisions were attempting to ensure that all members would abide by these decisions. This rejected confidence in the effectiveness of these organisations and also federalist ideology.”²⁴ In essence, this view prioritizes the bargaining power of states and the negotiation process. The supranational institution itself is solely significant because the entity can ensure that the commitments made between the states would be followed through as promised.

These five theories all approach European integration through a different perspective on the forces of integration and the relative power of the member states compared to the supranational entity. These theories are relevant for the existential crisis of the EU, as part of this crisis relates to the balance of power between the EU and its member states, as well as the level of integration required. The two most popular understandings of European integration today seem to be neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism. Neofunctionalism argues that further integration is beyond the power of individual states, as it is driven by economic integration and other factors that create problems that can only be solved at a supranational level. On the other hand, liberal intergovernmentalism argues that supranationalism is solely driven by the individual states, which ultimately maintain the power. Europe itself has to work through this conflict

²³ "Liberal Intergovernmentalism." Accessed November 27, 2016.
<http://testpolitics.pbworks.com/w/page/25854032/Liberal%20Intergovernmentalism> (also Azheimer and Meyers)

²⁴ "Liberal Intergovernmentalism"

over the reasons and driving forces behind integration, as uncertainty over the understanding of European integration only fuels the existential crisis the EU finds itself in today. Europe must decide if it wants to give states the primary power over European integration or if the EU claim the power to promote further integration.

AN OVERVIEW

This paper will begin by exploring the history of the development of the European Union in order to understand background of the European Union today. From there, this paper will describe the structure of the European Union today and will investigate public opinion on the European Union. The data from the public opinion on the EU will then be connected the input legitimacy and output legitimacy of the European Union.

There will then be a detailed analysis of the key political issues in Europe today and how these issues impact public perception of the EU. There will also be a discussion of outside factors that are also significant for the future of the EU. This paper will specifically use case studies on the United Kingdom, France, and Germany to understand how the top political issues in Europe contribute to an increase in Euroscepticism. These three countries will be used for the study, as they have historically been the most powerful countries in the EU, so their sentiments on the EU are of utmost importance for the future of the European Union.

The paper will conclude by analyzing the significance of the rise of Euroscepticism for the future of Europe. There will be a discussion of the five futures proposed by the European Commission, as well as an exploration of the potential for the EU to dismantle. Based on these possibilities, there will be an analysis of which future is the most likely. The insight gathered on the nature of the legitimacy crisis for Europe from previous sections

will then be synthesized and solutions to these issues will be proposed. Finally, there will be a discussion on why the European Union is significant both within Europe and on a global scale, as recognizing the importance of the EU is essential for its future.

CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND ON THE EUROPEAN UNION

In order to analyze the significance of a European identity as it relates to the European Union (EU), it is first necessary to gain an understanding of the EU itself. This includes detailing the creation and development of the European Union as well as describing the purpose, goals, and vision behind the Union.

Following a high-level description and analysis of the EU, one can gain a better understanding of the EU as it stands today, including its current structure and all relevant political institutions. From there, the paper will address public opinion on the European Union today, as this is necessary to understanding the legitimacy crisis that the EU faces.

THE HISTORY OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The European Union of 2017 is the product of over a half-century of European integration (see Appendix 1). The EU came into existence following multiple iterations of supranational organizations, each organization building a more integrated Europe. Each iteration shared a similar purpose, vision, and goals that the EU of today emulates. While these three words may seem synonymous, there are significant differences between these three measures when analyzed closely. The purpose of the EU signifies the initial reasons for its creation. In contrast, the vision of the EU is the ultimate dream for the future of the EU. The goals of the EU are much more tangible, individual steps that the EU hopes to achieve through its work. Essentially, the goals are the mechanisms through which the EU hopes to fulfill its purpose and achieve its vision. While these three approaches go hand in hand, there is some question as to whether there is tension between the purpose, goals, and vision, which this paper will investigate.

THE PURPOSE, VISION, AND GOALS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The underlying purpose of the EU is relatively simple: peace through economic integration. Following World War II, the European Coal and Steel community was founded in 1951. While this trade agreement is far from the scale and integration of the EU today, this agreement was the initial precursor to the modern common market that is the EU. Both of these entities, and every step in between the two entities, are based on the same key idea that “countries that trade with one another become economically interdependent and so [they are] more likely to avoid conflict”²⁵ While the ECSC was purely economic in function at the start, it expanded into a political union in 1993 with the Treaty of Maastricht. To date, it seems that the EU has worked toward economic integration with significant success, achieving its goals of decreasing tariffs and facilitating the free movement of labor within the EU. This economic integration can be largely credited for over sixty years of peace in Europe, as the founding fathers of the ECSC, Robert Schuman and Jean Monnet, had hoped.

In addition to promoting economic integration for peace, the EU also views its purpose as promoting human rights, democracy, and rule of law within Europe and around the world as established in the 2009 Treaty of Lisbon, which included the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. Specifically, the EU agreed to uphold and promote the human rights of dignity, freedoms, equality, solidarity, citizens’ rights, and justice.²⁶ This EU Charter of Fundamental Rights holds not just symbolic significance, but practical significance as well. The question of human rights is front and center when considering Turkey’s application to

²⁵ “The EU in Brief.” Europa.eu. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-in-brief_en (Oct. 16 2016).

²⁶ *Consolidated Versions of the Treaty On European Union and of the Treaty On the Functioning of the European Union: Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union* (Luxemburg: Office for Official publications of the European Communities, ©2010), 1.

join the European Union. Joannes Hahn, an Enlargement Official for the EU, criticized Turkey for its recent backsliding in human rights, rule of law, and democracy. He specifically pointed to the measures taken following the attempted coup d'état in July 2016, allegations of torture, exclusion of pro-Kurdish political parties, and the efforts of the Turkish parliament to reinstate the death penalty. Hahn argued that these actions and others "seem to be incompatible with Turkey's official desire to become a member of the European Union,"²⁷ implying that the EU holds its belief in human rights as a core tenant for EU membership, not just the potential for economic growth. The EU developed from the European Community, not only in the sense of the prior supranational organization, but also in the sense that it stands for a group of people with shared values.

The close connection between the government of the EU and the non-governing Council of Europe, a body that solely focuses on promoting European values, testifies to the importance of human rights, democracy, and rule of law in the Europe and, by extension, the EU itself.²⁸ The Council of Europe was founded in 1949 and now has 47 member states with 5 observer states. This organization has created over 200 legally binding treaties since its creation, all of which advance or protect the key values of the Council. No state has ever joined the EU without first having been a member of the Council of Europe, which provides

²⁷ Gutman, Roy . "EU presses Turkey on human rights and other issues; President Erdogan demands membership decision." *LA Times*, November 9, 2016. Accessed December 29, 2016. <http://www.latimes.com/world/europe/la-fg-turkey-european-union-20161109-story.html>.

²⁸ The Council of Europe is separate from the EU. It is not to be confused with the European Council, which is a EU institution, composed of Heads of States or Heads of Governments. The European Council sets the overall political direction for the EU. The Council of Europe is also not to be confused with the Council of the European Union, which is another EU institution. The Council of the EU is one of the legislative bodies of the EU that is composed of government ministers from each member state. While these three bodies are named similarly, they are all distinct.

evidence for the emphasis the EU places on human rights, democracy, and rule of law.²⁹

These values percolate into the EU itself, such that the purpose of the EU includes promoting these three values.

The overarching vision many perceive for the EU is “to fulfill the historical ideal of European unity.”³⁰ Although the EU was formed relatively recently in history, the idea of European integration, or even European unity, began thousands of years ago with Rome. The Roman Empire united the majority of the European subcontinent, and now serves as a common history for Europe. This shared history leads to fairly similar values today, and the idea that through unity, Europe can resurrect the glory, power, and peace that Europe enjoyed during the Roman Empire. Charlemagne first attempted to resurrect this ancient empire and unify Europe again with his Holy Roman Empire, and while this venture generally failed, his vision continues to survive. Today, the feelings of unity and fraternity still thrive throughout Europe, and many view European unity as the ultimate dream for Europe.³¹

While peace through economic integration, protecting human rights, and fulfilling historical aspirations may be the high-level purposes and vision of the EU, the EU has more tangible goals for economic development, political stability, and regional security. Jones and Verdun argue that most state policy makers primarily view “the EU as serving to improve the security of their state, [and] to aid its economic growth.”³² The EU strengthens

²⁹ Lobey, Sophie. “History, Role, and Activities of the Council of Europe: Facts, Figures and Information Sources.” » Hauser Global Law School Program, April 2005. Accessed December 29, 2016. http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Council_of_Europe.html

³⁰ Jones, Erik, and Amy Verdun, eds. *The Political Economy of European Integration: Theory and Analysis*. London: Routledge, 2005. Accessed October 19, 2016

³¹ “European Unity: The History of an Idea.” *The Economist*, December 30, 2003. Accessed October 25, 2016. <http://www.economist.com/node/2313040>.

³² Jones, Erik, and Amy Verdun.

the defenses of Member States primarily through the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and the European Defense Agency (EDA). The CSDP strengthens “peace-keeping operations, conflict prevention and in the strengthening of the international security,”³³ while the EDA facilitates “defense cooperation among its Member States for the whole life-cycle of a capability including cooperation in research and technology as well as procurement or training.”³⁴ To promote economic growth within Europe, the EU enables most people, goods, services, and capital to move freely within the EU under the idea that reducing internal economic barriers will facilitate economic growth.³⁵ Building on the idea of economic advancement, the EU adopted the Euro as a common currency for most member-states with the idea that “not only are fluctuation risks and exchange costs eliminated and the single market strengthened, but the euro also means closer co-operation among Member States for a stable currency and economy to the benefit of us all.”³⁶ There are some examples of the practical goals of the EU to for economic development, political stability, and regional security.

THE FOUNDING FATHERS: JEAN MONNET AND ROBERT SCHUMAN

By most regards, the first step to the creation of the European Union was the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951. This organization was the thought product of Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman, who are

³³ "The Common Security and Defense Policy." European Union External Action. Accessed October 25, 2016. https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/431/the-common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp_en.

³⁴ EEAS. "CSDP structure, instruments, and agencies." European Union External Action. Last modified August 7, 2016. Accessed April 8, 2017. https://eeas.europa.eu/topics/common-security-and-defence-policy-csdp/5392/csdp-structure-instruments-and-agencies_en.

³⁵ "The EU in Brief."

³⁶ "Why the Euro?" Europa.eu. http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/why/index_en.htm (Accessed Oct. 16 2016).

generally recognized as the visionaries responsible for ECSC and the ultimate creation for the European Union. Schuman and Monnet provide significant evidence to support the aforementioned underlying purpose, vision, and goals of the European Union. Monnet, a technocrat at heart, drafted the Monnet Plan, laying out the steps for the formation of the ECSC. He knew that he could not sell the plan to the European people solely based on economic integration and that he would have to appeal to higher-level European values for the plan to succeed. Schuman, the more charismatic of the pair, publically announced this plan with his famous Schuman Declaration in 1950, clearly stating the reasons why such a unique body would be beneficial.

Jean Monnet, a French diplomat, is remembered as the “architect of Europe”³⁷ for his key role in planning the integration of Europe. In addition to drafting the plans for the ECSC, he attempted to create the European Defense Community in 1954. Although this was rejected, he later founded the Action Committee for a United Europe in 1955, guided by his belief that “prosperity and social progress depended absolutely upon closer economic ties between European States.”³⁸ In a letter to the founding members, Monnet states that the purpose of the Action Committee for a United Europe was to “to achieve a United States of Europe by concrete accomplishments.”³⁹ To achieve this vision, he argued, “mere cooperation between governments will not suffice. It is indispensable for States to delegate certain of their powers to European federal institutions responsible to (*mandataires de*) all

³⁷ “High Authority of the European Community for Coal and Steel.” *The New Monnet Plan*. By Leonard Tennyson. 11th ed. 1955. Accessed November 26, 2016.

³⁸ “The Monnet Plan - From the Schuman Plan to the Paris Treaty (1950–1952).” *The Monnet Plan - From the Schuman Plan to the Paris Treaty (1950–1952)* - CVCE Website. Accessed November 26, 2016. <http://www.cvce.eu/en/recherche/unit-content/-/unit/5cc6b004-33b7-4e44-b6db-f5f9e6c01023/4802c240-1497-4127-9b14-f7b6896d6fd9>.

³⁹ “The New Monnet Plan.” *Bulletin from the European Community for Coal and Steel*. No. 11, December 1955. [EU Other]

the participating countries taken as a whole."⁴⁰ Monnet learned from the failure of the European Defense Community that the key to European political and economic integration lay in convincing individual governments and people to buy into the idea of a common Europe by fostering a sense of European identity. He wrote in the New York Times that "if the governments are to be persuaded to make the choice they have postponed and to set up common institutions to which they delegate powers, it will be necessary for the many powerful political parties, consumer groups, and trade unions which increasingly favour European unity to organize in order to press their beliefs and to explain them to the public and to the governments themselves."⁴¹ In other words, the start of political change through common institutions had to initiate with the people of key groups by their choosing to act as European citizens in unity with a shared identity, and then pressuring their government to oblige. Learning from the prior failure, Monnet's different methods that emphasized a shared European identity to promote the Action Committee for a United Europe was a success and this new venture received high levels of public support.⁴²

Although Monnet was the architect of European integration, Schuman was its public face. On May 9th of 1950, French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman issued the famous Schuman Declaration, which laid the groundwork for the ECSC. This organization, on a tangible level, was meant to pool industrial production of coal and steel for member nations (namely France and Germany) under one common authority, which would hopefully create peace from economic integration; however, the organization had much

⁴⁰ *The New Monnet Plan*

⁴¹ *The New Monnet Plan*

higher ambitions than simply fusing coal and steel production, as Schuman's proclamation explained his ultimate hopes for a united Europe.

Schuman began this speech by recognizing the importance of peace in Europe. He made a bold proposal that "an organized and revitalized Europe can make a contribution to civilization which is indispensable for maintaining such peaceful relations."⁴³ Such statements provide strong evidence that the founders of the ECSC, the first step to the establishment of the EU, strongly equated these institutions with the purpose of promoting peace in Europe following nearly a half-century of war. Moreover, Schuman explained how peace could be achieved through integration by saying that "merging of our interests in coal and steel production and our joint action will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not only unthinkable but materially impossible."⁴⁴ Simply put, fusing economic interests minimizes any chance of war occurring between member nations, thereby promoting peace within the subcontinent; however, Schuman did not limit the idea of peace to peace within Europe. Recognizing the important role Europe plays on the world stage and the recent evidence for European wars expanding to global violence, he declared that the ECSC proposal would "bring to reality the first solid groundwork for a European Federation vital to the preservation of world peace."⁴⁵

In addition to focusing on peace through economic unity, Schuman declared, "Europe will be born from this, a Europe which is solidly united and constructed around a strong framework," tying into the ultimate vision he had for the ECSC to begin the path

⁴³ Schuman, Robert. "Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950." Accessed November 26, 2016. [http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/attachments/293_Schuman Declaration - 9 May 1950.pdf](http://www.internationaldemocracywatch.org/attachments/293_Schuman%20Declaration%20-%209%20May%201950.pdf).

⁴⁴ "Schuman Declaration"

⁴⁵ "Schuman Declaration"

toward unity in Europe.⁴⁶ He envisioned that the ECSC would lead way to a “European Federation” with greater organization and unity, and stated, “pooling of coal and steel production will immediately assure the establishment of common bases for economic development as a first step for the European Federation.”⁴⁷ This shows that he viewed the ECSC as not only creating peace and stability within Europe, but also achieving a higher vision of unity—the sort of unity that can only be achieved through a shared identity as Europeans taking priority.

Schuman recognized that peace in Europe and the ultimate vision of European unity would occur through the realization of individual, tangible goals. He expressed this thought by saying, “Europe will not be made at once, nor according to a single master plan of construction. It will be built by concrete achievements, which create de facto dependence, mutual interests and the desire for common action.”⁴⁸ With this understanding of the necessity of tangible steps being taken, Schuman then declared specific goals that should be realized for the success of the ECSC. First, Schuman proposed “to place Franco-German production of coal and steel under one common High Authority in an organisation open to the participation of other countries of Europe.”⁴⁹ He directly correlated these goals with the higher ambitions of peace and unity by saying “the fusion of interests which is vital for the establishment of a common economic system will be realized. Thus the leaven will be introduced which will permeate and build a wider and deeper community between countries that had continually opposed each other in bloody divisions.”⁵⁰ Such a statement

⁴⁶ “Schuman Declaration”

⁴⁷ “Schuman Declaration”

⁴⁸ “Schuman Declaration”

⁴⁹ “Schuman Declaration”

⁵⁰ “Schuman Declaration”

clearly shows that Schuman recognized that individual, tangible goals for economic integration were necessary to ultimately achieve the higher purpose of stability and vision of unity behind the ECSC.

TIMELINE OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was officially ratified in 1952, with France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg as the original members. Its purpose was to integrate the coal and steel industries of Europe through “the establishment of a common market for coal and steel for those countries willing to delegate control of these sectors of their economies to an independent authority.”⁵¹ While this specific function seems to be primarily economic, its economic goals simultaneously served political aspirations for European integration as previously discussed.

At an economic level, the ECSC was quite successful at achieving its goals. Steel production increased fourfold, such that it was now of better quality, cheaper, and produced more cleanly due to integration under a higher authority. While coal production fell, its technological development, environmental standards, and safety standards all improved, causing the ECSC to be widely viewed as an economic success. Outside of economics, it appears that the ECSC’s economic success led to further demand for integration, which led to the Treaty of Rome.⁵²

⁵¹ "European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)." Encyclopedia Britannica Online. Accessed November 27, 2016. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/European-Coal-and-Steel-Community>.

⁵² "Treaty Establishing the European Coal and Steel Community." EUR-Lex. Accessed December 2, 2016. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:xy0022>

The Treaty of Rome was established in 1957, which created the European Economic Community (EEC) as well as the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC).⁵³ The EEC, EAEC, and ECSC are together referred to as the European Communities, which advanced the level of integration dramatically from the ECSC alone. The EEC advanced the initial steps of the ECSC by working towards a common market between the member states. By 1968, the EEC had eliminated tariffs between member countries.

Additionally, the member countries agreed to establish a common external trade policy with the same tariffs for non-member countries with the Treaty of Rome. This economic union was a major step towards establishing a true common market and ultimately signifies a shift toward political unity in addition to the prior efforts to develop economic integration.

Finally, the Treaty of Rome accounted for the “free movement of workers and freedom of establishment, and thus individuals as employees or service providers,”⁵⁴ although there were some limitations as free movement was restricted solely to workers whereas the Schengen Agreement expanded free movement to all European citizens. Aside from advancing economic integration, the EEC laid the foundation for the political underpinnings of European integration. Specifically, it created the European Commission, the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, as well as the European Court of Justice.⁵⁵ Initially Belgium, France, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, and West Germany signed the Treaty of Rome, although the EEC expanded to include a total of 12 members by

⁵³ "The Treaty of Rome (1957) - The History of the European Union and European Citizenship." The History of the European Union and European Citizenship. Accessed November 27, 2016.
<http://www.historiasiglo20.org/europe/traroma.htm>.

⁵⁴ "Free Movement of Persons." European Parliament At Your Service. Accessed November 27, 2016.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/atyourservice/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_2.1.3.html

⁵⁵ "European Community (EC)." Encyclopedia Britannica Online. Accessed November 27, 2016.
<https://www.britannica.com/topic/European-Community-European-economic-association>

1990. Through all of these measures, the EEC sought to “lay the foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe.”⁵⁶

The period following the creation of the EEC is frequently referred to as a period of “eurosclerosis,” or stagnation in the process of European integration. One explanation for this is that the EEC increased from six members to nine members, which increased the complexity and ultimately led to resistance. Additionally, this increase in membership occurred during an economic slowdown, which perhaps cast doubt on the economic advancement promised from integration, as recessions historically tend to increase economic protectionism and the rise of nationalist sentiments.⁵⁷

This period was especially marked by tension between France and the EEC. One key cause of tension was the renegotiation of agricultural regulations. The revision of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) was due to occur in 1965. Under the revision, the financing was to come from the Community directly, and no longer from individual member nations. This appeared as an increase in supranationalism, that wasn’t entirely welcome to France. Even more so, the proposals were to provide “for an extension of the powers and responsibilities of the Parliamentary Assembly and particularly of the Commission, which emphasised the supranational character of the EEC.”⁵⁸ In spite of public opposition from French General de Gaulle, the proposal was submitted to the European Parliament without directly consulting member nations. This tension from increased integration was expounded given that the evolution to the third state of transition to a

⁵⁶ “The Treaty of Rome”

⁵⁷ Anil, Awesti. *The Myth of Eurosclerosis: European Integration in the 1970s*. L'Europe en Formation, 3/2009 (n° 353 - 354), p. 39-53.

⁵⁸ “Causes of the Crisis.” CVCE.eu. Accessed December 2, 2016. <http://www.cvce.eu/en/recherche/unit-content/-/unit/02bb76df-d066-4c08-a58a-d4686a3e68ff/4d86bcc2-1834-4888-99b2-d61ea5118c9c>

common market was set to start in 1966. France viewed these combined events as threats to its national sovereignty.⁵⁹

Due to its opposition, France refused to take its seat at the Council of Ministers until its demands were met, a boycott that is now referred to as the “empty chair crisis.” This act was significant, as it was the first time since the Treaty of Rome was enacted in 1958 that the EEC could not operate due to the actions of a member state. This crisis lasted for six months, but was ultimately resolved by the Luxembourg Compromise. This compromise encourages cooperation and “stipulates that if a Member State believes that its vital interests are at stake, negotiations have to continue until a universally acceptable compromise is reached.” While this compromise was successful in resolving this crisis, it was ultimately changed in 1987 with the Single European Act that expanded the range of decisions that could be made simply by a qualified majority.⁶⁰ While moving to a qualified majority can improve efficiency, the switch away from requiring consensus can be viewed by member states as undermining national sovereignty, as a member state can then be mandated to follow a decision of the body that passed by qualified majority even if the state itself opposed the decision.

In spite of these setbacks, a number of incremental steps toward integration occurred in the 1970s and 1980s. Firstly, the European Parliament developed new competencies including “the incremental development of its budgetary powers in 1970/75 and direct elections in 1979.” Additionally, political interest groups aiming to influence national governments developed increased attention for the EEEEC. Foreign policy

⁵⁹ “Causes of the Crisis.”

⁶⁰ “The Luxembourg Compromise (January 1966).” CVCE.eu. Accessed December 2, 2016. <http://www.cvce.eu/en/education/unit-content/-/unit/d1cfaf4d-8b5c-4334-ac1d-0438f4a0d617/a9aaa0cd-4401-45ba-867f-50e4e04cf272>

cooperation also advanced through the European Political Cooperation (EPC), which facilitated foreign policy coordination. The European Commission also grew in significance as it developed increased policy-making abilities and launched the European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979. Finally, the European Court of Justice also made multiple significant rulings that facilitated political integration. Through these measures, we can see that in spite of increased economic protectionism and the rise of Euroscepticism from the 1960s to the 1980s, there was some progress toward further integration.⁶¹

European integration rebounded with the Treaty of Maastricht, which was signed in 1992. This treaty created the European Union with three pillars: the European Communities (reformed version of the EEC, ECSC, and EAEC), Common Security and Foreign Policy (CSFP), and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) that facilitated police and judicial cooperation. This treaty went beyond the primarily economic measures of former treaties like the EEC and moved toward increased political integration. This treaty also clarified and expanded the roles of the European Parliament, European Commission, and the Council of Ministers. Additionally, it further expanded the idea of a European community by creating policies related to trans-European networks, industrial policy, culture, and introducing the concept of European citizenship. Through European citizenship, citizens of member nations became simultaneous European citizens, which expanded their rights to travel and live anywhere within the EU. Finally, this treaty planned for a monetary union, facilitating the ultimate goal of a single market. Ultimately, this treaty called for the creation of a common currency by 1999 as well as the Central European Bank (CEB) and European System of

⁶¹ Anil, Awesti.

Central Banks (ECBSB).⁶² While these bodies and the treaty as a whole was eventually revised under the Treaty of Nice, its ultimate foundations were not significantly changed until the Treaty of Lisbon.

The Treaty of Maastricht almost failed to be ratified as the people of Denmark rejected it in 1992 in a public referendum. While this rejection was perceived as threatening the entire experiment of European integration, today many view it as the “result of a preference for an intergovernmental type of European Co-operation.”⁶³ Additionally, the Danish are recognized for having a particularly strong national identity, largely due to the country’s homogeneous society with nation and state almost perfectly coinciding, which can pose challenges for European integration.⁶⁴

Because approval from all member nations was required for the Treaty, the Edinburg Agreement gave Denmark four exceptions to the Treaty of Maastricht. The most exception was that Denmark claimed the right to opt-out of monetary integration, such that it would not be required to use the Euro. The United Kingdom also has similar reservations, and both countries secured the right to opt-out of a monetary union.⁶⁵

In spite of the Danish and UK opt-outs, the Euro was established in 1999 as planned in the Treaty of Maastricht, although it wasn’t until 2002 that Euro notes were introduced. The adoption of a single currency was proposed under the rationale that it would facilitate the adoption of common monetary policy and would “ensure this currency’s stability

⁶² “Treaty of Maastricht on European Union.” EUR-Lex Access to European Law. Accessed November 27, 2016.

<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV%3Axy0026>

⁶³ Worre, T. (1995), *First No, Then Yes: The Danish Referendums on the Maastricht Treaty 1992 and 1993*. JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, 33: 235–257. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5965.1995.tb00529.x

⁶⁴ Gotsi, Daniella, Ali Haider, Joanna Ivars, and Marloes Van Den Berg. *Nationalism in Denmark and the Euro*. Roskilde University. Edited by Linni Rita Gad. 2006. Accessed December 2, 2016.

⁶⁵ “Opting Out.” EUR-Lex: Access to European Union Law. Accessed December 2, 2016. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/summary/glossary/opting_out.html

thanks to price stability and respect for the market economy.”⁶⁶ Today, 19 of the 27 EU members have adopted the Euro with only Denmark and the United Kingdom opting out of the Euro while the remaining nations have yet to qualify for the Euro.⁶⁷ Many of the nations that have yet to qualify appear to be making minimal efforts to do so, and the EU similarly appears to refrain from exerting pressure for them to do so.

In 2004, the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was signed, pending ultimate approval from all of the member states. This Constitution ultimately failed due to rejections from France and The Netherlands in referendums in 2005. Although it failed, the Constitution is still noteworthy, primarily to gain an understanding of the very reasons it failed. The European Constitution served to repeal the previous treaties and then replace them with minor revisions in a single document. To many, the complete repealing of previous Treaties perhaps seemed extreme, even if the ultimate product was substantively similar in many ways. Additionally, studies suggest that the rejection of the Constitution by both the French and Dutch public in national referendums⁶⁸ was largely a result of Euro-skepticism, or a “fundamentally question[ing] the specific form of the EU.” In essence, the reservations of the French and the Dutch related to skepticism about adopting a European identity over a national identity, similar to the initial rejection of the Treaty of Maastricht by Denmark. Such skepticism played a largely role in the European Constitution, rather than previous or future treaties, presumably because the simple use of the word

⁶⁶ “Treaty of Maastricht.”

⁶⁷ “The Euro.” European Commission: Economic and Financial Affairs. Accessed November 27, 2016. http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/index_en.htm

⁶⁸ Grosskopf, Anke. *Why 'non' and 'nee' to the EU Constitution? Reconsidering the Shock of the Dutch and French Referenda*. University of Pittsburgh. Archive of European Integration. 2007. Accessed November 27, 2016.

“Constitution” (used 180 times in the document)⁶⁹ evokes thoughts of a single, unified government and appears more threatening to state sovereignty.

The Treaty of Lisbon, which was substantively rather similar to the failed European Constitution, was created in 2007 and ultimately adopted in 2009. This treaty primarily reformed the structure of the European Union because the EU had grown significantly since the Treaty of Maastricht and the Treaty of Nice, which necessitated reforms for the EU. As aforementioned, the Treaty of Lisbon shared many similarities with the European Constitution, as “the majority of the institutional and policy reforms envisaged in the Constitution are included in the Treaty of Lisbon, but presented in a different form.”⁷⁰ Rather than replacing all previous treaties, the Treaty of Lisbon simply revised them. By simply revising previous treaties and avoiding the associations brought up with the word “Constitution,” the Treaty of Lisbon make efficient revisions to the structure of the European Union without bringing up the prior resistance associated with an increased perception of a the EU infringing on state sovereignty or national identity. Essentially, it sacrificed the advancement of a European identity in favor of practical revisions that facilitated European integration, such that national identity and state sovereignty still felt respected. Perhaps European integration needed to be improved to function better, before people would be willing to give a European identity a chance. Although, some argue that even this would not help as national sovereignty is so ingrained that it could not be abandoned so quickly.

⁶⁹ “Constitution.” EU-ABC.com. Accessed November 27, 2016. <http://en.euabc.com/word/298>

⁷⁰ “The Treaty of Lisbon: Introduction.” EUR-Lex Access to European Law. Accessed November 27, 2016. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=uriserv%3Aai0033>

Some of the structural changes the Treaty of Lisbon made included revising the rules of composition for the key bodies of the EU, and the decision-making process of the European Council changed to qualified majority voting⁷¹. Additionally, the position of the President of the European Council was created. Perhaps most importantly, the Treaty of Lisbon abolished the old three-pillar structure and introduced a distribution of competencies between the EU and member states. Additionally, the powers of the European Parliament increased through this treaty with the ultimate goal of advancing democracy within the EU. The Treaty of Lisbon also revised the internal and external policies of the EU. Internally, the powers of the EU relating to border control, immigration, judicial cooperation, and police cooperation increased. Externally, the power of the Common foreign and Security Policy became more coherent, the High Representative of Foreign Affairs and Security Policy gained the ability to represent the EU globally, and sections of the founding treaties are now devoted to the Common Security and Defense Policy with the long term goal of establishing the Common European Defense.⁷² This was the latest major step in European integration, creating the EU as it functions today.

Throughout the development of the EU, tensions have occurred between the higher-level purpose and vision of the EU with its more concrete goals. Economic integration, save some difficulty with monetary integration under the EU, appears quite feasible in Europe, as it has already been accomplished to a great extent. Although the desire for economic integration is largely shared, there can be a conflict between those who purely value economic integration for the economic growth it promotes and those who view economic

⁷¹ The change to qualified majority voting could be seen as a threat to state sovereignty, as a state could be required to follow legislation it opposed if the state was in the minority opposition.

⁷² "The Treaty of Lisbon: Introduction"

integration as the means to peace and European unity. Additionally, difficulties and tensions can arise from attempts to push for political integration, because that can challenge preconceived notions of identity. Consequently, goals purely for integration that alluded to a single Europe, such as the Constitution of Europe, received pushback to a greater extent than goals for primarily economic integration. This evidence suggests that the vision of a unified Europe through economic integration is more likely to be opposed when specific measures appear to infringe upon national identities or national sovereignty. Any perceived threat on national identities or sovereignty could spark Eurosceptic sentiments and threaten further integration.

THE EUROPEAN UNION IN 2017

The EU of 2017 functions as a single market with no internal tariffs or quotas, common external tariffs and quotas, mobility of capital and people, a mostly common currency, as well as shared foreign, fiscal, and monetary policy.⁷³ As a single market, the European Union is a powerful entity within Europe as well as globally. Made up of 28 member states (see Appendix 2), the EU plays a powerful role on the world stage as the EU GDP tops €13,920, 541 million as of 2014. Although the EU accounts for less than 10% of the global population, it accounts for approximately 20% of global trade. This economic significance gives way to global political power that smaller European nations wouldn't possess alone.⁷⁴

⁷³ Gerber, Linda. "Economic Integration Lecture." Accessed December 29, 2016.

⁷⁴ "The Economy." *Europa*. Accessed December 29, 2016. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/figures/economy_en

THE KEY INSTITUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

There is no single institution, nor a single President or Prime Minister, in charge of the EU. Rather, the EU operates through seven key institutions (see Appendix 3 and Appendix 4), two advisory bodies, and multiple agencies. As the institutions have the greatest significance and power, it is necessary to understand their roles and power as that most directly relates to political tensions between the EU and member states.⁷⁵

The first institution of the EU is the European Council, which is a largely strategic body that decides the political direction of the EU. The European Council “gives to the Union the necessary impulses for its development and it defines the general political orientations.”⁷⁶ This institution is key in establishing the political purview and direction of the EU. The European Council is composed of the Heads of State or Heads of Government of all member states, as well as the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (CFSP) as the European Council represents the EU abroad for relevant aspects of the CFSP.

The European Commission is the executive arm of the EU. It is largely an administrative body that addresses practical issues of EU governance and is responsible for proposing legislation and the budget to the legislative bodies of the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. The Commission solicits input from member states and EU citizens by conducting “preliminary interviews with the governments of the member states, the representatives of industry and unions, and other experts, to take into

⁷⁵ “Detailed Explanations about the Institutions of the European Union.” Strasbourg, 2007. Accessed December 29, 2016. <http://en.strasbourg-europe.eu/detailed-explanations-about-the-institutions-of-the-european-union,3214,en.html>

⁷⁶ “Treaty on the European Union.” Europa. Accessed December 29, 2016. https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/treaty_on_european_union_en.pdf

account their interests in its initiatives” before legislative texts are submitted to the Council of the European Union and the Parliament. In addition to research and relations with member states, the Commission also enforces the implementation of legislation, treaties, and the budget. Finally, the Commission works to represent the EU globally under the instruction of the Council. The Commission is made up of one Commissioner from each member state, with each Commissioner in charge of a specific domain. Although each Commissioner is in charge of a specific area, the Commission as a whole must decide unanimously on every file. Furthermore, the Commissioners are not to represent the specific interests of their state, rather they are to represent the general interests of the EU. Therefore, the Commissioners are voted on by the European Parliament, rather than appointed by member states. The Commission also has a President who is appointed and serves a five-year term. While these are the official positions, the Commission also consists of thousands of administrators and researchers.⁷⁷

The European Parliament is the first of the legislative bodies of the EU, serving as the voice of the European citizens for the EU. This body is comprised of 751 Members of European Parliament (MEP) who are directly elected by the people of member states under a system of proportional representation. The number of MEPs each member state gets is based on its relative population. Within the Parliament, the MEPs group together not by nation, but by political party. The parties themselves are also very important in the European Union, as the parties play a large role in the legislative process. The two largest parties are the European People’s Party, a centre-right party and the Progressive Alliance of Socialists & Democrats, a centre-left party. There are six other parties (and some non-

⁷⁷ “Detailed Explanations.”

attached Members of Parliament that are independent from these parties) that represent other areas of the political spectrum.⁷⁸ The Parliament also has a President, who is appointed and serves a two and a half year term. The Parliament serves multiple functions, but most notably participates in legislative functions in collaboration with the Commission and the Council. The Parliament must be consulted on every piece of legislation. Additionally, Parliament serves budgetary power with the Council and has the specific power to modify non-mandatory expenditures, and approve the final budget of the Community.⁷⁹

The second legislative institution of the EU is the Council of the European Union, also known as the Council of Ministers or simply “the Council.” This institution is the voice of the governments of the member states. The Council is composed of government ministers from each member state and these ministers have the power to commit their governments to the actions the Council agrees upon. The Council has a President, which rotates among member nations with six month long terms for each President.⁸⁰ The Council works with the European Parliament (the two have equal power) on the budget of the EU and passing legislation proposed by the Commission. Previously all votes of the Council had to be unanimous, but the Lisbon Treaty revised this requirement such that votes no longer need to be unanimous, but passed legislation from a qualified majority can be vetoed by national parliaments. Some sensitive topics, such as foreign policy and taxation, still require unanimous votes.⁸¹

⁷⁸ "Political Groups." It's Your Parliament. Accessed April 29, 2017.
<http://www.itsyourparliament.eu/groups/>.

⁷⁹ "Detailed Explanations."

⁸⁰ "Detailed Explanations."

⁸¹ "Council of the European Union." EUROPA. March 09, 2017. Accessed April 08, 2017.
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/council-eu_en.

The Court of Justice of the European Union is the primarily legal institution of the EU. Its legal domain is focused on matters related to EU legislation, as the Court is “in charge of verifying the interpretation and the application of community legislation.”⁸² The Court is comprised of 28 judges, one per member state. Each judge, in addition to being recognized as a legal expert, must also have his or her “independence is beyond doubt.”⁸³ This qualification is significant as it signifies that the judges must not represent their national interests. Instead, the judges must consider legal matters based on EU law and the EU. In addition to the 28 judges, the Court consists of nine Advocates-General, who publically convey the conclusions of the Court. These Advocates-General must meet the same criteria of legal expertise and mental independence as the judges and are appointed with the agreement of all member state governments. The Court can hear cases petitioned by member states, European citizens, EU institutions, or other European entities. The rulings of the court require a majority of its judges, and are legally binding in all member states.

The European Central Bank (ECB) is an official EU organization for the member states that have adopted Euro-- the common currency of the EU. The ECB works with national central banks (the combination of which is often referred to as the Eurosystem) to ensure price stability and the stability of the value of the Euro by “defining and implementing monetary policy, conducting foreign exchange operations, holding and managing the euro area’s foreign currency reserves” and other measures. The ECB specifically exercises powers of “banking supervision, banknotes, statistics, macroprudential policy and financial stability as well as international and European

⁸² “Detailed Explanations.”

⁸³ “Detailed Explanations.”

cooperation” as well as setting interest rates.⁸⁴ The ECB is run by its Governing Council, which consists of the six members of the Executive Board as well the governors of the central banks of euro-using member states who are appointed by their home governments. The European Council appoints all members of the ECB Governing Council, including the President of the ECB, with a majority of votes. As of 2015 when Lithuania joined the euro area, the ECB voting procedures changed to a system utilizing rotational voting. As such, the governors representing the five largest economies will rotate a total of four voting rights, and the remaining governors from smaller economies will rotate eleven voting rights. Rotations for both groups occur on a monthly basis. Finally, the six Executive Board members each have voting rights.⁸⁵ Additionally, the ECB has a Supervisory Board composed of an appointed Chair, a Vice-Chair chosen from the Executive Board members, four ECB representatives, and representatives from national supervisors.

Finally, the Court of Auditors, while one of the lesser-known institutions, is quite significant as it is responsible for controlling the budget and ensuring that all budgetary matters are handled “in a lawful and regular manner.”⁸⁶ The Court of Auditors is made up of one Auditor per member state who is appointed for a six-year term by Council of the Union in consultation with Parliament. The Court of Auditors also consists of agents who manage the use and collection of EU funds with relations to EU institutions, member states, and any other organizations with EU funding.

⁸⁴ “Tasks.” European Central Bank. Europa. Accessed December 29, 2016.

<http://www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/tasks/html/index.en.html>

⁸⁵ “Rotation of Voting Rights in the Governing Council.” European Central Bank. Europa. Accessed December 29, 2016. <http://www.ecb.europa.eu/explainers/tell-me-more/html/voting-rotation.en.html>

⁸⁶ “Detailed Explanations.”

The institutions of the European Union, while limited by checks and balances, still hold vast amounts of power over many areas. It is only natural that there would then be some conflict between the power of the supranational organization and the individual power of its member states. There is controversy about the level of power and supervision that European citizens and member states have to supervise the EU. The Parliament is the only EU institution that directly answers to European citizens, causing many to think that the EU has a democratic deficit. Granted, the Council can be seen as indirectly represents the interests of European citizens as it consists of elected leaders of each member state. Nonetheless, the rest of the institutions answer only to the Parliament or the Council, which limits the ability of citizens to supervise EU governance and potentially limits the ability of member states to supervise EU governance as well.

This limited supervision abilities of European citizens and member states fuels the concerns of EU citizens and member states that national interests may not be valued at a supranational level, leading to a potential conflict of interests between the EU and member states. This limited supervision and democratic deficit likely contributes to anti-EU sentiments for those who favor a national identity over a European identity, which can influence national governments. In order to better understand the public perception on the European Union and the impact of this perception on the legitimacy of the EU, it is necessary to analyze data from the Eurobarometer survey, addresses these very topics.

EUROBAROMETER: PUBLIC OPINION ON THE EUROPEAN UNION

Biannually the European Commission conducts public opinion surveys related to the European Union. The most significant of these surveys is the Standard Eurobarometer, which largely focuses on public opinion of the European Union. In recent years, the

Eurobarometer survey studied the opinions of citizens of the 28 member countries, five candidate countries, and the Turkish Cypriot community not controlled by Cyprus. This survey has been conducted for all EU member states since 1973, providing ample evidence for how public opinion of the European Union has shifted over time. As this paper primarily focuses on the recent history of the European Union, this paper will primarily address the most recent decade of Eurobarometer data results based on Eurobarometer 85 from the spring of 2016. This study will especially focus on any trends or sudden shifts in public perspective, especially the notable shift towards a more negative tone between the 2015 and 2016 surveys.⁸⁷

On some level, the 2016 data shows that Europeans had a fairly positive view of the European Union, as 50% of EU 28 citizens were optimistic about the future of the EU and 51% of respondents wanted more decisions to be made at a EU level. Only 38% wanted fewer decisions to be made at a EU level. The majority of respondents agree that the EU was “democratic,” “modern,” “forward-thinking,” and “protective.” 75% of respondents felt that the terms “solidarity” and “security” brought to mind a positive feelings associated with the EU. On a practical note, 66% of respondents feel that the EU made it easier to do business in Europe.⁸⁸

From the data, it seems that Europeans generally focused on the practical goals of the EU, rather than its loftier visions and purpose. Within the EU member states, 50% of respondents said that the EU personally meant the “freedom to travel, study, and work anywhere in the EU.” 35% of respondents identified the Euro as their personal meaning for

⁸⁷ European Commission. *Standard Eurobarometer 85- Spring 2015- Public opinion in the European Union*. May 2016. Accessed January 27, 2017.

⁸⁸ Standard Eurobarometer 85.

the EU, and 28% selected “cultural diversity” as their meaning of the EU. The fourth most popular response for the meaning of the EU was “peace” (in line with the initial intents of the founders) at only 27%, which suggests that any argument basing the existence of the EU on creating peace comes second to tangible benefits the EU can deliver in the eyes of the people. Only 15% of respondents viewed a “loss of cultural identity” as a personal meaning of the EU, suggesting that the conflict between a specific cultural identity and the greater European identity may not be top of mind for many EU citizens; however, Europeans still seem to associate with national identity more than a European identity.⁸⁹ Primary identification with the state before identification with Europe can still pose an obstacle to European integration, even if the two are in direct conflict, as integration can come second to national interests.

The Spring 2015 Eurobarometer survey also asked questions on support for key EU policies, most of which received overwhelming support. The Common Security and Defense Policy had 74% approval, the Common Migration Policy had 73% approval, and the Common Energy Policy had 72% approval. The approval for a common foreign policy was slightly lower at 66%, but still maintained a firm majority. 57% of respondents favored the use of monetary union with the single currency of the Euro. Although, 7 countries had less than half the popular desire a single currency-- Cyprus, Bulgaria, Poland, Denmark, Sweden, Czech Republic, and the United Kingdom. 56% of respondents favored an agreement for free trade and investment between the EU and the USA. The only policy

⁸⁹ Standard Eurobarometer 85 and EU interviews

proposal that received less than majority support was for future EU enlargement, which had only 39% support.⁹⁰

Perhaps part of the reason for supporting the EU is that many European citizens felt that EU membership is necessary given that 55% of EU member state citizens disagree with the claim that their country could better face the future outside the EU. It seems that part of the reason for this sentiment is that 68% of respondents felt that the EU's voice counts in the world. Considering these two points together, it seems that many think that participating the EU, which as a single entity has much larger political and economic power than the sum of its parts, makes otherwise small and less significant European countries feel that they have a greater say in the world they would alone.⁹¹

Yet, not all of the data reflected positively on the EU. Up to 48% of respondents were not satisfied with how democracy works in the EU—the highest level of dissatisfaction since 2004. Only 42% of respondents were satisfied with how democracy works in the EU, which is rather disheartening for an organization that prides itself in its democracy. These numbers somewhat mirror the sentiments Europeans feel for democracy in their individual states, as 47% of respondents were not satisfied with how democracy works in their country. However, more people were satisfied with how democracy works in their countries as 51% of respondents were satisfied with democracy in their country, 9% higher than sentiments for the EU. Perhaps this dissatisfaction relates to the fact that 55% of respondents disagreed with the statement “my voice counts in the EU.” This starkly contrasts with how respondents felt their voice counts within their country, as 55% of

⁹⁰ European Commission. *Standard Eurobarometer 83- Spring 2015- Public opinion in the European Union*. May 2015. Accessed January 27, 2017. http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb83/eb83_publ_en.pdf.

⁹¹ Standard Eurobarometer 85.

respondents felt that their voice counts nationally. One could hypothesize that this is due to the larger size of the EU, which could make it seem like each individual voice counts less. Only 41% of respondents felt that the voice of their country as a whole was taken into account in the EU, which does provide ground for the sentiment of conflict of interests between the EU as a whole and its member states.⁹²

Additionally, 48% of respondents felt that the EU was “technocratic” and 55% of respondents felt that the EU was inefficient. Respondents were heavily divided on the question of the EU creating conditions for more jobs in Europe, with 45% of member state citizens saying that it was creating conditions for more jobs and 46% saying that it was failing to do so. Perhaps the strongest criticism was that 80% of respondents feel that the EU needed a clearer message, closely followed by the fact that 72% felt that the EU generated too much red tape.⁹³

The level of trust European citizens had for the EU was somewhat mixed. On one hand, trust in the EU (33%) surpassed trust in national governments (27%) by 5%. Although, having the trust of only 33% of respondents seems objectively low and is somewhat disheartening. Perhaps this data testifies to the general lack of trust in all forms of government and the establishment. Oddly enough, trust in the European Parliament, European Commission, and European Central Bank all surpassed the trust levels of the EU itself at 40%, 37%, and 34% respectively. Similarly, overall sentiments for the EU were somewhat mixed, and generally neutral. Within the EU 28, 34% of respondents said that the EU conjured a positive image for them and 38% of respondents said that the EU conjured a neutral image. Only 27% of respondents said the EU conjured up a negative

⁹² Standard Eurobarometer 85.

⁹³ Standard Eurobarometer 85.

image, although this view has been on the rise since 2015. While this may not seem problematic, as overall views aren't dramatically negative, the neutral view is at the heart of this issue. Citizens are more or less apathetic, which may be short of the public support needed to promote further European integration as it might require active support, not just passive tolerance.⁹⁴

Overall, the data suggests that there are low levels of input and output legitimacy for the EU. Related to input legitimacy, the first underlying problem that the EU faces is a detachment from its citizens and member-states, both from a democratic deficit, and low levels of trust signifying a sense of separation. Additionally, while citizens do not appear to feel a conflict between a European identity and their national identities, it is clear that the national identity comes first, which limits the authority of the EU. Finally, the very purpose of the EU seems unclear because the narrative of the EU's role in creating peace has lost power as memory of WWII has faded, leaving the purpose of the EU in its citizen's eyes unclear. Moreover, the EU suffers from a perceived low level of effectiveness and efficiency, which causes the EU to have low levels of output legitimacy. To an extent, the data also suggests that the EU suffers from challenges in communication, as the people feel it seems to struggle with communicating its overall purpose and value.

In spite of these difficulties, it seems that the EU citizens appear to still have hope for the EU and acknowledge that it does create some value, largely stemming from the practical difference it can make in their lives (for example, from free movement.) At a high level, EU citizens seem to support the EU policies—even wanting the policy making and

⁹⁴ Standard Eurobarometer 85.

decision making power of the EU to expand to a degree—but they do not feel a passionate matter of support for the EU due to the aforementioned underlying issues.

While the people maintain a sense of hope about the overall potential for the European Union, this hope and support is being challenged by an apparent lack of input legitimacy and output legitimacy. This conflict between hope for the EU and its lack of legitimacy has led to the existential crisis the EU is currently facing. It is absolutely imperative that the EU responds to the crisis in its input legitimacy and output legitimacy before the people lose all hope in the European Union.

CHAPTER 3: THE RISE OF EUROSCEPTICISM

Following over a half-century of increasing economic, political, and social integration in Europe, the past few years have been characterized by a significant increase in Euroscepticism within many member states of the European Union. The recent challenges related to the debt crisis, refugee crisis, and an increase in terrorism have highlighted how integration can have costs, causing some to wonder if such costs are worth the benefits. It is first necessary to understand these recent challenges facing Europe that have contributed to an increase in Euroscepticism. Additionally, it is necessary to understand the greater context that has contributed to the recent rise of Euroscepticism. After providing background on the challenges facing Europe and describing the context, this section will then analyze how Euroscepticism stemming from these challenges has increased in the United Kingdom, Germany, and France—the three most powerful countries in the European Union. Finally, this section will connect the recent challenges Europe has faced to the overarching problems with the input legitimacy and output legitimacy of the EU.

DEBT, REFUGEES, AND TERRORISM IN EUROPE

Economic and political integration, whether through a supranationalist entity like the EU or simply through globalization, has many benefits including more efficient productions of goods from economic specialization, shared knowledge, increased trade, and (presumably) political stability due to economic interdependence. These benefits unfortunately have costs including: a restructuring of jobs due to specialization, feelings of threat surrounding national identities, and the complex economic dynamics that result from richer, more developed countries being economically tied to less economically

advance countries. In theory, one can see how integration can be better for everyone under free trade theory and its supporting arguments; however, Europe is now seeing the costs of integration in a very tangible manner. Moreover, Europe is realizing that integration may have indirect costs, such as the potential security threat from free movement within the EU given the risk of terrorism, that Europe did not expect. These costs can require some to give in unequal amounts (ex: richer countries providing economic support for poorer countries), which can give rise to the formation of groups within the EU and, ultimately, an “us versus them” mindset.

While many issues within Europe are contributing to the development of Euroscepticism, three of the most significant are: economic issues stemming from the debt crisis and slow economic growth, the European refugee crisis and its implications for immigration, and the recent increase in terrorist attacks in Europe. These issues raise significant questions about the economic stability, culture, and security of Europe—three concerns which are central to the survival of the European Union. Whether supranationalism is the best way to resolve these issues is debatable; but it is clear that if the EU fails to make progress responding to these issues, member nations could choose to forsake integration in favor of the perceived benefits of providing for their own security and economic policy rather than trusting other member states to buttress their efforts.

Economic concerns are highly significant to the rise of Euroscepticism. Since 2014, the EU has been in a period of economic stagnation with GDP growth hovering around 2%. While this is fairly healthy, it is slower than pre-2008 levels and concerns from the

economic recession linger.⁹⁵ The economic situation is identified as the third most important problem facing the EU today in the Eurobarometer survey.⁹⁶ In an attempt to stimulate economic growth, many European nations took on debt, which has led to today's debt crisis in Europe. Five specific nations (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain— humorously abbreviated as PIIGS), took on an exceptionally large amount of debt. The ability of these nations to pay back their debts was under question, and the risk of default imminent at the height of the debt crisis in 2010. The loaning countries ultimately needed the bailout just as much as the loan receiving countries, because the bailouts were necessary to prevent the banks of the lending countries from going under. Consequently, the IMF, European Union, and ECB all stepped in to craft bailouts and avoid default. If any of these countries, most significantly, Greece, were to default the entire economic system risked failure due to the far-reaching impact of bank failures and the impact the defaults would have the value of the Euro. In 2011, the Bank of England labeled the debt crisis as "the most serious financial crisis at least since the 1930s, if not ever." Since 2011, the debt crisis has stabilized somewhat due to supranational intervention, but it is still a relevant concern.⁹⁷ The economic fears and debt crisis contributed to an "us versus them" mindset for lending and borrowing countries, leading to today's level of Euroscepticism.

Another key issue confronting the EU is the European refugee crisis. In 2015 alone, over one million refugees arrived in Europe with hopes for a better life.⁹⁸ The arrival of these refugees has raised many questions in Europe: Where should the refugees go? How

⁹⁵ "European Union GDP Annual Growth Rate." Trading Economics. Accessed April 8, 2017. <http://www.tradingeconomics.com/european-union/gdp-annual-growth-rate>.

⁹⁶ Standard Eurobarometer 85.

⁹⁷ Kenny, Thomas. "What is the European Debt Crisis?" The Balance. Last modified February 21, 2017. Accessed April 8, 2017. <https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-the-european-debt-crisis-416918>.

⁹⁸ "Migrant Crisis: Migration to Europe Explained in Seven Charts." BBC. Last modified March 4, 2016. Accessed April 8, 2017. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34131911>.

can the refugee programs be paid for? Immigration, largely stemming from the refugee crisis, is voted the most important problem facing Europe to date with 48% of the population agreeing.⁹⁹ Countries where the refugees have been arriving (Italy, Greece, Hungary) have faced a disproportionate burden. While Germany had the most total asylum applications, Hungary had the most applications on a per capita basis with approximately 1,800 refugees per 100,000 Hungarians. In an attempt to relieve the refugee burden on arrival nations, the EU instituted a quota system where other EU member states will accept a specified amount of refugees from Italy and Greece, two nations facing particularly severe refugee burdens.¹⁰⁰ Still, many arrival nations or countries hosting a large amount of refugees are of the opinion that they are carrying a disproportionate amount of the refugee burden. This leads to a high amount of tension within the EU relating to the hosting and funding of refugees, especially given that this humanitarian crisis shows no signs of ending soon. Additionally, the possibilities of the refugees remaining in Europe for the distant future raises tensions related to significant cultural divides, language barriers, and job placement.

In an attempt to relieve pressures on Europe from refugees, the Balkan migration route was closed and the EU made a deal with Turkey in March of 2016. In this deal, Turkey “agreed to stop asylum seekers from crossing by sea to the Greek islands” and refugees currently settled in the Greek islands were to be transferred to Turkey.¹⁰¹ In exchange, the EU agreed to pay €6 billion to Turkey to assist the refugee community hosted by Turkey

⁹⁹ Standard Eurobarometer 85.

¹⁰⁰ “Migrant Crisis”

¹⁰¹ Squires, Nick. "A year on from EU-Turkey deal, refugees and migrants in limbo commit suicide and suffer from trauma." The Telegraph. March 14, 2017. Accessed April 29, 2017.
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/03/14/year-eu-turkey-deal-refugees-migrants-limbo-commit-suicide-suffer/>.

and the EU would accept some Syrian asylum seekers currently in Turkey to other European countries.¹⁰² Unfortunately, these efforts to reduce the stress of refugees on Europe fell far short of expectations and the refugee inflow is still far beyond what Europe seems able—or willing—to handle.

In 2015, there was an unprecedented amount of terrorist attacks in Europe, which made terrorism a major concern for the EU. Terrorism was voted the second most important problem facing Europe in the Spring 2016 Eurobarometer survey.¹⁰³ The increase in concern for terrorism raises many questions that the EU must face about the degree of common security and intelligence related to terrorism. This concern also heavily relates to concerns about refugees and immigration, as both connect to fears about open border within Europe. Additionally, some fear that terrorists could mask as refugees to enter Europe. While these concerns could unite Europe against the common threat, different opinions on how to respond to the threat also raise tensions.

These three issues have pushed the EU to a breaking point, as Europe seemingly faces challenges from all corners. These issues have caused Europeans to question not only the ability of the EU to effectively respond to these issues as its output legitimacy falls into question, but also to question if supranationalism is even the best way to confront these issues as many begin to think that the costs outweigh the benefits. While it is true that these issues play a significant role in the recent rise of Euroscepticism, it is also necessary to understand the greater context that has factored into the rise of Euroscepticism.

¹⁰² Gogou, Kondylia. "The EU-Turkey deal: Europe's year of shame." Amnesty International. March 20, 2017. Accessed April 29, 2017. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2017/03/the-eu-turkey-deal-europes-year-of-shame/>.

¹⁰³ Standard Eurobarometer 85.

OTHER FACTORS RELEVANT TO EUROSCEPTICISM

While the tangible issues of the refugee crisis, economic concerns over the recession and debt crisis, and increased fear of terrorist attacks have contributed to the rise in Euroscepticism by casting doubt on the output legitimacy of the EU, these issues are not the only reason for the recent increase in Euroscepticism. Euroscepticism has existed since the beginning of European integration following WWII, well before any of these issues took center stage. However, the prevalence of Euroscepticism has undeniably increased in recent years. Euroscepticism has become increasingly popular among formerly moderate individuals, whereas it used to be solely championed by those on the political fringes. While this increase in Euroscepticism is largely due to the falling input and output legitimacy of the EU, it also must also be viewed in greater context. As technology has rapidly developed and facilitated communication, the fringe Eurosceptic groups can now communicate their positions easier than ever before, which allows their messages to spread and their support to grow. In essence, the advancement of technology that facilitates communication (such as social media), has contributed to the ease in which Euroscepticism has spread.¹⁰⁴

Additionally, since WWII the entire globe has become more connected as economic ties between nations have grown, creating unprecedented levels of globalization. The increased globalization has led to increased economic growth and specialization under the theory of comparative advantage proposed by Ricardo and Smith, but the resulting shift in economic production has caused some in wealthier nations to lose jobs that can be done more efficiently in the developing world. As a result, there has been increasing anti-globalization sentiments across the globe in many developed areas, including Europe. To

¹⁰⁴ EU Interviews (see Appendix 6)

some, these feelings of anti-globalization can lead to hyper-nationalism, which can then translate to Euroscepticism if other European nations are viewed as economic competition rather than sources of economic growth.¹⁰⁵

Finally, the increase in Euroscepticism must be viewed in the context of the global rise of anti-establishment sentiments. There has been an upsurge in populism, or the political support for the interests and wellbeing of the common people, around the globe. These anti-establishment views have largely portrayed the political elite as at odds with the interests of the common citizen.¹⁰⁶ This concept of the anti-establishment brand of populism factors into the lack of input legitimacy of the EU, as European citizens view the elite EU politicians and technocrats as detached from their problems. Therefore, the rise of anti-establishment populism also factors into the increase in Euroscepticism.¹⁰⁷

While there are many factors contributing to the increase in Euroscepticism, there are a few factors that contribute to support for the EU. One of which is the fact that free movement within the Schengen area has contributed to feelings of connection and solidarity within Europe. This idea can be supported by the fact that most citizens viewed “free movement” as the primary meaning of the EU to be for them.¹⁰⁸

Another factor that can increase support for the EU is the increasing threat of Europe’s eastern neighbor, Russia. As the Ukrainian civil war rages on and Putin continues to flex Russia’s muscles on the global stage, the threat of Russia is becoming more prominent. On one hand, this threat could be perceived as a literal military threat, as many

¹⁰⁵ EU Interviews (see Appendix 6)

¹⁰⁶ "Populist." Merriam-Webster. Accessed April 08, 2017. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/populist>.

¹⁰⁷ EU Interviews (see Appendix 6)

¹⁰⁸ Standard Eurobarometer 85

people fear Russia could be looking to increase its regional power by gaining land in Eastern Europe.¹⁰⁹ The threat is also political, as talk of Russian influence in elections and media influence in Europe has grown. When the Russian threat has historically increased, European countries have a tendency of banding together for common support and strength. This could be beneficial for the EU if nations set aside their doubts of the EU in favor of common strength against the Russian threat.

All in all, the recent rise of Euroscepticism relates to a perfect storm of three European problems that have cast doubt on the output legitimacy of the EU: the recession and resulting debt crisis, the refugee crisis, and the increasing threat of terrorism. These three factors, in combination with outside factors such as opposition to globalization, widespread anti-establishment populism movements, and the advancement of technology has contributed to a rise in Euroscepticism. All of these surface level issues shed light on severe underlying issues with the input legitimacy and output legitimacy of the EU.

While these issues impact all member states of the European Union¹¹⁰, the impact on the UK, Germany, and France is especially important. These three countries have the largest economies of the European Union, and they have been politically dominant in the creation and development of the EU.¹¹¹ Germany and France were particularly important for the creation of the EU, as they chose to set aside a history of war and instead foster cooperation in hopes of peace. Aside from history, the economic strength of these nations

¹⁰⁹ O'Connor, Tom. "U.S. conducts 'Savage Wolf' NATO drills in Lithuania amid Russia tensions." *Newsweek*. April 06, 2017. Accessed April 08, 2017. <http://www.newsweek.com/us-military-tanks-troops-lithuania-savage-wolf-drills-580018>.

¹¹⁰ For example, the 2017 election in the Netherlands also featured a prominent anti-EU candidate. "Dutch Elections: All You Need to Know." *The Guardian*. Last modified March 2, 2017. Accessed April 8, 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/mar/02/dutch-parliamentary-elections-everything-you-need-to-know-brexit-vote-trump-geert-wilders>.

¹¹¹ "European Union GDP Annual Growth Rate."

gives them a position of power in the EU, which they frequently use to shape the direction of the EU. The fate of the EU heavily rests with these three states; hence it is necessary to give particular attention to the current rise of Euroscepticism in all three states.

THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND

The first nation to analyze is the United Kingdom (UK), as it is currently in negotiations to leave the EU.. It may seem counterintuitive to discuss the UK when analyzing the future of the European Union; however, it is necessary to discuss the UK for this very reason. The UK has a history of a strong national identity, such that it has historically resisted integration with the European subcontinent. Brexit (a common term for the exit of Britain from the EU) is the first case of identity and other controversies foreshadowing a possible reversal of integration in the European Union. Additionally, the prosperity or hardships of the UK once it leaves the EU will factor into public perception of the benefits and detriments of the EU itself, which ultimately impacts the future of the EU. Finally, there are some scenarios in which the UK may not ultimately leave the EU (for example: if the UK holds another referendum to attempt to change the Brexit vote), so it is important to still consider the impact of the UK on the EU from that perspective as well.¹¹²

Nationalism exists within the UK on multiple levels, both in regard Europe as well as at a subnational level. Northern Ireland, Wales, and Scotland all have their own nationalist sentiments that must be considered. In 2014, a referendum was held for Scottish independence and, while the margin was close, those who favored remaining in the UK

¹¹² Interviews with EU officials, March 13-17, 2017. (see Appendix 6)

ultimately won.¹¹³ Nonetheless, Scottish nationalist sentiments have not dissipated since the referendum, and some suggest that they have even grown.

While these sub-nationalist sentiments must be considered for the UK, nationalism has historically been rendered more successfully at a national level with regards to European integration. The UK exists on a separate island— both literally and metaphorically distant from the rest of Europe. The country has been a reluctant participant in the EU at best, always advocating for its own independent identity as seen through its refusal to adopt the Euro and its strict protection of its national borders by refusing to adopt free movement from the Schengen agreement.¹¹⁴

The relationship between the UK and the EU has always been a bit rocky, at best. In 1975, the UK held a referendum to leave the EEC. While this referendum concluded with a large majority voting in favor of staying in the EEC, the simple fact that it was held shows the sense of division between the UK and the greater European community. Since then, various attempts to hold a referendum to withdraw have been proposed. It was the platform of the Labour Party during the 1983 election, although the Labour Party lost to the Conservative Party with Margaret Thatcher by a large margin. In 1997 a separate Referendum Party was created on the basis of leaving the EU, although it only achieved 2.6% of the vote. More recently, there were calls for Prime Minister David Cameron to hold a referendum on EU membership since 2012. While he initially resisted, the pressure grew such that he agreed to hold a referendum if re-elected in 2015. When he was re-elected, he

¹¹³ "Scotland Decides." BBC News. Accessed April 8, 2017. <http://www.bbc.com/news/events/scotland-decides/results>.

¹¹⁴ "Schengen: Controversial EU Free Movement Deal Explained." BBC News. Last modified April 24, 2016. Accessed April 8, 2017. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-13194723>.

followed through with his promise and received support from Parliament with the European Union Referendum Act of 2015.

Initially, Prime Minister Cameron worked to avoid a referendum by attempting to renegotiate the terms of the UK relationship with the EU, as he did not support leaving but felt the public pressure to support UK interests. In early February of 2016, Cameron publically announced the terms of a proposed deal between the UK and the EU. Most people supported the key measures of the deal (preventing a “European super state,” promoting internal economic competition, allowing the UK to not adopt the Euro, and preventing new EU migrants from receiving in work benefits) for not going far enough to protect the interests of the UK (see Appendix 5).¹¹⁵ As a result of this criticism of the proposed deal, Prime Minister Cameron announced that a referendum on EU membership would be held on June 23, 2016.¹¹⁶

In June of 2016, just a few weeks before the UK Referendum on EU membership, the Observer conducted a national survey that suggested otherwise. In this survey, 46% of people indicated they were in favor of leaving the EU, 38% said they were in favor of remaining in the EU, and 17% were unsure. Perhaps this correlated to the fact that only 13% of respondents felt that being European was a large part of who they were, in comparison to the 61% who felt it did not describe them, which suggests an identity conflict was present. Yet, only 32% of respondents felt personally worried about UK membership in the EU. In comparison, 58% of respondents were worried about terrorism,

¹¹⁵ Dahlgreen, Will. "Draft EU deal gives boost to Leave campaign." February 4, 2016. Accessed April 08, 2017. <https://yougov.co.uk/news/2016/02/04/eu-referendum-leave-leads-nine/>.

¹¹⁶ Iyengar, Rishi. "These 3 Facts Explain Why the U.K. Held the 'Brexit' Referendum." Time Inc. Last modified June 24, 2016. Accessed April 8, 2017. <http://time.com/4381184/uk-brexit-european-union-referendum-cameron/>.

53% of respondents were worried about immigration, and 46% of respondents worried about the economy.¹¹⁷ This suggests that the EU itself may not be the problem, but the perceived connection of the EU to the people's concerns about the economy, terrorism, and immigration was the driving factor of the vote. The survey found that views on immigration were most likely to impact voting in the referendum, as "49% say it [immigration] will influence how they vote, and this figure increases to 72% among those who will vote to leave."¹¹⁸ Further evidence that terrorism and immigration were key issues in the vote include the fact that "of those questioned, 38% said they had changed their views on the issue over the previous six months, a time frame that included the Paris terror attacks, the worsening refugee crisis and the mass sexual assaults in Cologne on New Year's Eve."¹¹⁹

The economic impact of leaving the EU was also relevant in the survey, although it was mixed. Those who favored leaving were more likely to cite immigration as their motivation, and those who favored staying were more likely to cite potential economic harm from leaving the EU as a reason for staying. That being said, more Britons felt that Brexit would be good for their finances, with 38% responding it would be financially beneficial versus 30% responding that it would be financially detrimental. Even if Eurosceptics felt that the EU was economically beneficial, 54% of respondents believed that "the effects of immigration now outweigh any trade benefits the EU brings."¹²⁰

From this survey, it was clear that some groups supported leaving the EU more

¹¹⁷ Mann, Jim. "Britain Uncovered Survey Results: The Attitudes and Beliefs of Britons in 2015." The Guardian. Last modified April 19, 2015. Accessed April 8, 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/apr/19/britain-uncovered-survey-attitudes-beliefs-britons-2015>.

¹¹⁸ Mann, Jim. "Britons and Europe: The Survey Results." The Guardian. Last modified March 20, 2016. Accessed April 8, 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/mar/20/britons-on-europe-survey-results-opinion-poll-referendum>.

¹¹⁹ Mann, Jim. "Britons and Europe: The Survey Results."

¹²⁰ Mann, Jim. "Britons and Europe: The Survey Results."

strongly than others. For example, as would be expected, individuals that politically identified with the United Kingdom Independence Party (which, as the name suggests, argues for UK independence from the EU) favored leaving at 83% in support, whereas members of the Lib Dem, Green, Conservative, and Labour parties were more likely to be in favor of staying in the EU. The correlation of Euroscepticism was especially noteworthy with age, as “younger Britons are more likely to vote to remain in the EU while older Britons are more likely to favour Brexit,” perhaps because younger Britons have always had a stronger European identity because they have no memory of an independent United Kingdom.¹²¹

While this survey provided some premonition that the vote to leave was gaining momentum, the vote itself occurred on June 23 of 2016 with 72.2% voter turnout. 51.9% of voters elected to leave the EU and 48.1% voted to remain. The vote itself showed many of the same demographic trends that the earlier Observer survey revealed. For example, 75% of voters aged 24 and under voted to stay in the EU. Additionally, individuals with higher education and individuals with a higher median income (above £30K) were more likely to vote in favor of remaining in the EU.¹²²

Two key areas of the UK, Scotland and Northern Ireland, favored remaining in the EU with 62% and 55.8% of the vote in each area, respectively. The fact that these areas favored remaining has raised talk of new independence referendums in both areas, such that the two areas could remain in the EU. Perhaps, this will provide fuel for these sub-

¹²¹ Mann, Jim. "Britons and Europe: The Survey Results."

¹²² Speed, Barbara. "How did different demographic groups vote in the EU referendum?" NewStatesman. June 24, 2016. Accessed April 08, 2017. <http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/staggers/2016/06/how-did-different-demographic-groups-vote-eu-referendum>.

nationalism movements to succeed.¹²³

On a higher level, the result of the “Brexit” proceedings has significance not only for the territories of Scotland and Northern Ireland, but for other member states of the EU. As the UK prepares to leave the EU, the rest of Europe is watching. If the UK appears to economically and socially thrive following its presumed exit from the EU, its success could spark similar nationalist movements in other member states to leave the EU. Perhaps the biggest takeaway from the Brexit vote is the significance of a European identity in contributing to support for the EU, as that seemed to be a large factor in the vote.

THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Following World War II (WWII), Germany was in economic and political turmoil. The country was struggling to rebuild following the devastation of WWII, both politically and economically. Germany drafted a new constitution and implemented key economic stimulus measures that ultimately led to the growth of the German economy, which is now the largest economy in the EU. These political and economic reforms transformed the nation into a current leader within the EU, giving Germany a significant degree of influence on other member states and the direction of the EU as a whole.

One of the most important changes Germany made to rebuild after WWII was design a new constitution entitled Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany) in 1949, which Eastern Germany later adopted following reunification in 1990. After the devastation that hyper-nationalism and fascism had wreaked on Germany and the entire European subcontinent, the country was determined to avoid repeating history by severely

¹²³ "EU Referendum Results." BBC News. Accessed April 08, 2017.
http://www.bbc.com/news/politics/eu_referendum/results.

restricting the ability of hyper-nationalist sentiments to be realized by the German government. The Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany intentionally replaced the extreme form of proportional representation that contributed to Hitler's rise with a mixed form of proportional representation, which requires a minimum of 5% of the vote for representation, and elections in single member constituencies. These changes helped prevent extreme hyper-nationalist parties from being represented in German Parliament, which prevents them from gaining power and spreading their views.¹²⁴

Following WWII, Germany was in economic turmoil. Initially, Germany benefited from American aid for economic stimulus through the Marshall Plan in the late 1940s. This helped the economy survive, and the Germany economy began to thrive in the 1950s and 1960s when the newly rebuilt Western German government was established and implemented policies to cut inflation, reduce controls, cut high marginal tax rates. These stimulus measures helped the Western German economy grow tremendously, and lay the economic foundation for the strong German economy of today.¹²⁵ This economic strength is a large form of the influence Germany has in the European Union, as the nation is a key provider of much needed loans to the struggling PIIGS countries. Moreover, Germany issues a significant degree of power over the European Central Bank (ECB), which can be seen by the fact that Germany insisted that the ECB headquarters be in Germany.

Over the past half-century as Germany underwent significant political and economic changes to become the democratic leader it is today, a suppression of extremes—especially

¹²⁴ "Europe." Constitution: Law and Politics. Accessed April 8, 2017.
<https://www.britannica.com/topic/constitution-politics-and-law/Europe#ref384611>.

¹²⁵ Henderson, David R. "German Economic Miracle." German Economic Miracle: The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics | Library of Economics and Liberty. Accessed April 08, 2017.
<http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/GermanEconomicMiracle.html>.

hyper-nationalism— has consistently been an undercurrent. The German Chancellor since 2005, Angela Merkel of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party, has consistently faced pressure from both the left and the right. As leader of the CDU party, Merkel generally opts for a centrist route with right-leaning tendencies. The CDU is a centre-right party that is conservative on social issues but supports a free market economy, social welfare, and European integration.¹²⁶ While this tactic largely aligns with the greater philosophy of post-WWII Germany, its effectiveness seems to be faltering as Merkel's ability to win reelection in 2017 is coming into question. Merkel's biggest challenger in the 2017 election appears to be a Social Democrat, Martin Schulz, who is the former President of the European Parliament and is largely in favor of the European Union. Polls suggest that Schulz would win 50% of the popular vote, although the popular vote in Germany is irrelevant as Chancellors are selected by the Parliament.¹²⁷

Over the years, Merkel and the CDU party has largely supported the EU, although they want the EU to function on German terms. This can most easily be demonstrated by Merkel's insistence that Italy and Greece implement austerity measures, which reflects German economic views.¹²⁸ Germany has a high level of tension with many of the highly indebted EU states. For example, a 2015 poll found that 47% of Germans wanted Greece to

¹²⁶ Conradt, David P. "Christian Democratic Union (CDU)." Encyclopædia Britannica. December 16, 2015. Accessed April 29, 2017. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Christian-Democratic-Union-political-party-Germany>.

¹²⁷ "Schulz overtakes Merkel in opinion poll as favorite for German chancellor | News | DW.COM | 02.02.2017." DW. February 2, 2017. Accessed April 08, 2017. <http://www.dw.com/en/schulz-overtakes-merkel-in-opinion-poll-as-favorite-for-german-chancellor/a-37389601>.

¹²⁸ "The Chancellor's Crucible." The Economist. November 07, 2015. Accessed April 08, 2017. <http://www.economist.com/news/briefing/21677622-after-ten-years-power-angela-merkel-being-forged-anew-refugee-crisis>.

leave the EU, and many supporter tough austerity measures.¹²⁹ This data illustrates how Germany generally supports the EU, but want it to function on German terms—especially financially. Another key aspect of the European debt crisis is that it revealed the Merkel's status as the de facto leader of the European Union as she took the lead on the bailout negotiations and is the EU's longest-serving incumbent head of government, which perhaps relates to German's general support for the EU as their leader generally plays a significant role in the EU itself. This can make Germany feel less detached from the EU than other countries, and can also make Germany feel that its national interests will be protected.

While Germany generally supports the EU, the shifting power of Merkel and the CDU is significant because it largely signifies some level of German discontent with her approach to the EU. Specifically, Merkel's shifting power in Germany largely seems to stem from her role in the European refugee crisis and the increase in terrorism. Merkel has been very open to Germany receiving refugees during the European migrant crisis, which is credited for leading to her approval ratings falling to 54% in 2015—the lowest level since 2011. In a 2016 survey by ARD, 65% of respondents were not satisfied with Merkel's policy on refugees. Terrorism is also causing issues for Merkel, as her approval levels fell to 47% following the two terrorists attacks on German soil in July of 2016.¹³⁰

Merkel's primary challenger in this election, Schulz of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SDP), largely supports European integration from an ideological perspective. As the leader of the SDP, Schulz and the SDP party work to promote social welfare, as well as

¹²⁹ McHugh, Jess. "Greek Debt Crisis: Poll Shows Finland And Germany Still Tough On Greece, But Support For A Grexit Wanes." *International Business Times*. October 7, 2015. Accessed April 8, 2017. <http://www.ibtimes.com/greek-debt-crisis-poll-shows-finland-germany-still-tough-greece-support-grexit-wanes-2003698>.

¹³⁰ Ehni, Ellen. "Majority Against EU Accession of Turkey." *GermanyTrend*. April 8, 2016. Accessed April 8, 2017. <https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/deutschlandtrend-585.html>.

the values of social democracy: freedom, justice, and social solidarity. Schulz and the SPD support the EU not only to the extent that it can bring practical benefits to Germany, but also on an ideological level as European integration is in line with the party's values.¹³¹ Schulz shows how populism, or political support for the common man, doesn't necessarily mean Euroscepticism. Schulz gained popularity largely due to his image as a politician for the people. He stands not only for the common German, but also for the common European. In fact, one of his campaign slogans is "Make Europe Great Again," shedding light on how populism need not oppose European integration. Schulz campaigns on the fact that European integration, when done thoughtfully, can benefit the common man through economic growth.¹³²

Fringe parties, most notably the far-right nationalist Alternative for Germany party (AFD), are also gaining power in response to the discontent of some German's with Merkel's EU dealings. While the AFD is far from gaining the majority of support with only 16% approval ratings, the AFD is significant because the party's approval ratings have been consistently growing since 2013. Moreover, it is highly likely that the AFD party will gain increased presence in the federal Parliament following the 2017 elections.¹³³ The AFD champions German nationalism, and strongly opposes the EU. Frans Weise of the AFD claims that when the AFD presumably gains increased representation in German Parliament in 2017, "'Dexit' will be at the top of our agenda," referring to an initiative for

¹³¹ Conradt, David P. "Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD)." Encyclopædia Britannica. December 16, 2015. Accessed April 29, 2017. <https://www.britannica.com/topic/Social-Democratic-Party-of-Germany>.

¹³² Stelzenmüller, Constanze. "Meet Martin Schulz, the Europhile populist shaking up Germany's elections." February 27, 2017. Accessed April 08, 2017. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2017/02/27/meet-martin-schultz-the-europhile-populist-shaking-up-germanys-elections/?utm_term=.ff3f9db84861.

¹³³ Davis, Austin. "Social Democrat threatens Merkel's stronghold in Germany elections." The Washington Times. February 06, 2017. Accessed April 08, 2017. <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/feb/6/martin-schulz-seen-as-threat-to-angela-merkel-in-g/>.

Germany to exit the EU. While this would be quite difficult to realize not only because the majority of Germans seem to be support the EU, but also because the German Constitution doesn't currently allow for a national referendum, the fact that the AFD is gaining popularity suggests that its ideas are gaining support.¹³⁴

It seems that discontent of Merkel's approach to the EU has led to two political movements. The first of which is the rise of the hyper-nationalist and Eurosceptic AFD party. It is clear that the stress of the refugee crisis and the threat of terror are leaving a significance impact on Germany, building on its economic divide with heavily indebted EU member states. While Euroscepticism is far from becoming the majority view in Germany, this analysis shows that the issues confounding the EU can also impact national political shifts, as Merkel's authority is threatened. The second movement is the rise of Schulz and the Social Democrats who argue that European integration can benefit the German citizens when done well and that European integration is important for European values. Perhaps the rise of Schulz alludes to a different understanding of the purpose of the EU—a more values based approach in comparison to Merkel's seemingly more pragmatic approach.

Perhaps Merkel will continue to lead Germany, but it is clear that her policies are being challenged more so than ever before. While Germans still appear to approve of the EU more so than Britons as a Forsa poll conducted in Germany around the time of the Brexit vote found that 79% of Germans would vote in favor of remaining in the EU if they had a similar referendum.¹³⁵ Germany, by far is the most in favor of the EU of the three countries discussed, perhaps because it has the highest degree of influence over the EU and can largely shape the EU based on German interests. Therefore, it feels a stronger sense of

¹³⁴ Breitenbach, Dagmar.

¹³⁵ Breitenbach, Dagmar.

connection with the EU than most member states. The power of connection with the EU leading to EU support can also suggest the danger a feeling of detachment between a member state and the EU can do to EU support in that country.

THE FRENCH REPUBLIC

France has enjoyed status as a European power following its victory with the allies in World War II, which gave it a seat of power in the European Union. France also has one of the largest economies in the EU, which bolsters its position of influence in the EU. Initially, France was determined to exert its power in the EU, largely to counteract the influence of Germany following World War II; however, in recent years, France has seen a significant uptick in Euroscepticism and an increasing opposition to the EU.

In order to understand the current rise of nationalist sentiments in France, it is first necessary to understand French history and culture—especially the significance of the Algerian War. Algeria had been a French protectorate since the 1830's and became a true colony in the 1900's; however, Algeria was viewed as more than simply a colony, it was viewed as part of France. These views began to change in the early 1900's, as the Algerian natives increased resistance against exploitation by the French. The movement culminated in the Algerian War of Independence, which was fought from 1954 until 1962, coinciding with the waning of colonialism following WWII.¹³⁶ The historically relationship between the primarily country of Christian France and its primarily Muslim former colony of Algeria led to lasting consequences for France, as it contributed to significant Muslim minority population in France. Today, France has approximately 4.7 million Muslims (7.5% of its

¹³⁶ Curtius, Quintus. "The Algerian War Of Independence: Lessons For Today A key conflict in 20th century military history." August 17, 2017. Accessed April 08, 2017. <http://www.returnofkings.com/69318/the-algerian-war-of-independence>.

population), which is one of the largest Muslim populations in the EU.¹³⁷ While France is largely tolerant of this diversity, there is still a significant gap between the French Catholic majority, and the Muslim minority. Many of the Muslim descendants living in France following the Algerian war feel “excluded from mainstream society because of their Arabic names or the color of their skin.”¹³⁸ This degree of separation is only increased by the French emphasis on secularity, when has recently reached the news for many legal challenges for public displays of faith—especially those of Muslims—such as women wearing veils.

France has experienced multiple terrorist attacks by Muslim extremists in recent years. These attacks have had a significant effect on France, which already struggles from Muslim tensions, as many French now perceive the EU as “incapable of ensuring security within its territory and to control the external borders and to regulate migration flows.”¹³⁹ The French are also reacting against the refugee crisis, with a recent Elabe poll finding that 58% of French citizens opposed to allowing refugees into its country. Additionally, many French people feel that “EU membership... has grown with the disappointments, mainly economic,” especially following the recession and debt crisis.¹⁴⁰

These issues have contributed to growing levels of Euroscepticism in France. 40% of French citizens think the EU has more drawbacks than advantages, with only 26% thinking the opposite. In 2015, the National Front (FN) political party that champions Euroscepticism picked up 6.8 million votes in regional elections. Additionally, a poll by the

¹³⁷ Hackett, Conrad. "5 facts about the Muslim population in Europe." July 19, 2016. Accessed April 08, 2017. <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/19/5-facts-about-the-muslim-population-in-europe/>.

¹³⁸ Power, Carla. "Charlie Hebdo: The Tension Between France And Its Muslim Population." January 8, 2015. Accessed April 08, 2017. <http://time.com/3659241/paris-terror-attack-muslim-islam/>.

¹³⁹ "French are 'even more anti-EU than the Brits'" February 30, 2016. Accessed April 8, 2017. <http://www.thelocal.fr/20160330/france-home-to-more-eurosceptics-than-the-uk>.

¹⁴⁰ "French are 'even more anti-EU than the Brits'"

University of Edinburgh found that that majority of French citizens want to follow Britain and hold a referendum on France's EU membership.¹⁴¹ Both of these facts provide evidence of significant levels of Euroscepticism in France.

As France has its presidential elections this year, and the presidential elections essentially test public support for the EU. The two individuals advancing from the first round of elections are Marine Le Pen of the National Front Party and Emmanuel Macron of the En Marche! Party. Le Pen is a severe Eurosceptic, determined to hold a referendum for France EU membership if she wins. Macron is generally in support of the EU and emphasizes working with the EU to reform in response to the challenges it faces.

In the past few years, Marine Le Pen of the National Front (FN) party has gained significant prominence. She came in second place for the first round of presidential elections with 21.5% of the vote, only 2.3% behind Macron, the first place finisher.¹⁴² Most polls predict that Le Pen will be "defeated in the 7 May run-off," but her second place finish in the first round of presidential elections suggest that her views resonate with many French citizens.¹⁴³ The FN party has historically been far right, and was previously led by Marine Le Pen's father, who is widely identified as a racist. Under him, the party denied the holocaust and largely supported xenophobia. Marine Le Pen has shifted the party and split with some of her father's views, although the party still champions French nationalism. Her opposition to immigration, hard stance on Islamic extremism, Euroscepticism seem to have taken hold with many of the French citizens.

¹⁴¹ "French are 'even more anti-EU than the Brits'"

¹⁴² Kirk, Ashley, and Patrick Scott. "French presidential election: Polls and odds tracker." The Telegraph. April 29, 2017. Accessed April 29, 2017. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/0/french-presidential-election-poll-tracker-odds/>.

¹⁴³ Henley, Jon. "Marine Le Pen promises liberation from the EU with France-first policies." The Guardian. February 05, 2017. Accessed April 08, 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/05/marine-le-pen-promises-liberation-from-the-eu-with-france-first-policies>.

Le Pen champions many historically right views and she “envision[s] a France with closed borders, its own currency, and tough immigration controls; a country that is independent of international bodies like NATO, and one that ultimately puts itself first.” Indeed, “France First” has been a rallying cry for Le Pen and her supporters, especially in regards to the EU. The FN party and Le Pen pledge that if they gain power they will “take France out of the Eurozone and – unless the EU agrees to revert to a loose coalition of nations with neither a single currency nor a border-free area – to hold a referendum on France’s EU membership.”¹⁴⁴ Under Le Pen, the party (and the Euroscepticism the party champions) has gained support, growing from 18% support in 2010 to 24% support today.¹⁴⁵

Le Pen has tapped into not only a form of French nationalism that champions Euroscepticism, but also a form of French nationalism that promotes pride in a “true” cultural French identity. She maintains that cultural practices that differ from the accepted mainstream in France –especially those of France’s Muslim population such as veils, mosques, or public prayer—are threats to France that “no French person ... attached to his dignity can accept.”¹⁴⁶ This adds a new layer of insight to Le Pen’s “France first” motto, which perhaps would be better articulated as “native French first.”¹⁴⁷ This narrow view of a French identity also sheds light on reasons for the FN brand of Euroscepticism, as a European identity could also be seen as a threat to a “true” French identity.

While Le Pen’s popularity has risen, her primary challenger seems to be Emmanuel

¹⁴⁴ Henley, Jon. “Marine Le Pen promises liberation from the EU with France-first policies.”

¹⁴⁵ Nowak, Marysia, and Becky Branford. “France elections: What makes Marine Le Pen far right?” BBC News. February 10, 2017. Accessed April 08, 2017. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38321401>.

¹⁴⁶ Henley, Jon. “Marine Le Pen promises liberation from the EU with France-first policies.”

¹⁴⁷ Nowak, Marysia, and Becky Branford. “France elections: What makes Marine Le Pen far right?”

Macron, who came in first place in the first round of the presidential election with 23.8% of the vote.¹⁴⁸ Many polls suggest that he will win over Le Pen in the May 7th run-off.¹⁴⁹

Nonetheless, Macron faces an uphill battle as he runs as an independent liberal centrist.

While Macron recognizes some flaws in the EU, he is committed to reforming the EU for stronger economic growth and to ensure that the EU continues to prioritize social concerns. He champions reforms for a less austerity-focused Eurozone and refuses to re-impose internal borders with fellow EU members.¹⁵⁰ As such, the vote between Le Pen and Macron is effectively a vote between opposing the EU due to its failures, or supporting the EU by committing to work to improve its current flaws.

It is clear that the 2017 election in France is largely based on the views of the French people toward the EU. Through their vote, the people must show if they support the EU and European integration, or if Euroscepticism combined with French nationalism will be victorious. Le Pen's motto of placing (native) France first and her high degree of opposition to the EU suggest that it isn't simply the threats of terrorism, immigration, and economic costs that guide the rise in French Euroscepticism. In France, even to a higher degree than in the UK and most certainly more so than Germany, the EU has recently been viewed as a threat to the French identity and national interests. The French have a history of pride in their culture and values, one that supranationalism and the integration it promotes appear to be threatening in the eyes of the people. It is even plausible that the French feel a level of detachment from the EU, due to the large influence of Merkel and Germany in the EU. Le

¹⁴⁸ Kirk, Ashley, and Patrick Scott. "French presidential election: Polls and odds tracker."

¹⁴⁹ "French election 2017: Who are the candidates?" BBC News. March 20, 2017. Accessed April 08, 2017. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38220690>.

¹⁵⁰ Kettle, Martin. "An Emmanuel Macron victory would give the EU a chance to save itself | Martin Kettle." The Guardian. February 09, 2017. Accessed April 08, 2017. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/feb/09/emmanuel-macron-france-reform-eu-britain>.

Pen taps into fears about the EU threatening the French identity and national interests when she claims, “what is at stake in this election is the continuity of France... our existence as a people.”¹⁵¹ Yet, Macron’s popularity provides evidence that there is still significant support for the EU within France. In essence, the French people will have to vote in favor of the EU and integration, or against it in favor of Euroscepticism. The decision of the French people will have extreme significance for the future of the EU, as French has historically been one of the most powerful countries in the EU. If Macron wins, the EU has a chance at surviving and perhaps improving its effectiveness and increasing integration; but if Le Pen wins many people fear that her victory could lead to a French departure from the EU, which could spark further disintegration within the EU.¹⁵²

CONNECTING EUROPEAN CHALLENGES TO LEGITIMACY

In the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—arguably the three most powerful nations in the European Union—recent years have been marked by a significant increase in Euroscepticism. In the UK, these sentiments resulted in a referendum to leave the EU, which received a majority of votes and since then has triggered proceedings for the UK to leave the EU under Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty. Germany remains the most in favor of the EU of these three countries, but it has still experienced an increase in nationalism and Euroscepticism with the increasing popularity of the AFD Party. France has seen a significant rise in Euroscepticism with a dramatic increase for support for Marine Le Pen and the ultra-nationalist FN party, which calls for France to hold a similar referendum as

¹⁵¹ Henley, Jon. "Marine Le Pen promises liberation from the EU with France-first policies."

¹⁵² Interviews with EU officials, March 13-17, 2017. (see Appendix 6)

the UK to leave the EU. While it is unlikely that Le Pen will ultimately win the election, the dramatic increase in support for her ideas must be considered.

Ultimately, the increase of Euroscepticism in these three countries and across Europe can be traced directly to concerns over refugees and immigration, security concerns related to terrorism, and economic stressors from the recent financial crisis and the resulting European debt crisis. The inability of the EU to respond to these issues effectively has shed doubt on the output legitimacy of the EU.

These challenges also reveal underlying issues in the input legitimacy of the EU. The case studies of France and the UK highlighted how a weak European identity or a strong national identity relative to a European identity can lead to Euroscepticism.¹⁵³ Through the case study on France, it also seems plausible that a sense of detachment or lack of trust can also lead to Euroscepticism. Finally, the German analysis showed how conflict over the purpose of the EU is present, even in a country that is largely in favor of the EU, which undermined the input legitimacy of the EU.

For the EU to survive through these challenges (as many believe that the EU is truly at a significant point in its history that has the power to shape or destroy the EU) it is clear that the EU must change. Considering the underlying issues with input legitimacy and output legitimacy, the EU must do more than simply develop a coherent and effective

¹⁵³ While some countries may have always had weak European identities like the UK, it also seems that that costs of supranationalism are now being realized more so than they have been in the past. These costs can include financial costs (such as providing loans to other economically struggling EU countries or financial support to care for refugees) or the costs can be indirect costs (such as the costs that stem from security concerns from open borders in an age of terrorism.) Regardless, these perceived costs appear to be creating an “us versus them” mindset within the European Union, as national interests seem to be in misaligned with European integration. These newly visible costs bolster national identities relative to a European identity. Presumably, the perceived conflict would be to a lesser degree if the European identity was stronger, based on Social Identity Theory. Regardless of if the source of a weak European identity was historically present or newly brought on due to the perceived costs of supranationalism, it still undermines the input legitimacy of the EU.

solution to the three aforementioned issues Europe faces, but it must do so in a way that addresses the underlying legitimacy issues of the EU, builds trust in the EU from its citizens, and communicates the value of the EU.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵⁴ Santa Fe Institute. "In-group Altruism And Hostility Toward Outsiders Evolved Together." ScienceDaily. www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2007/10/071026173536.htm (accessed April 8, 2017).

CHAPTER 4: THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

The European Union is nothing more and nothing less than what its member states desire it to be. While there have always been disagreements surrounding the power and domain of the EU, today its very existence is called into question as the Eurosceptic movement has gained unprecedented prominence. In March of 2017, the Commission published the White Paper on the Future of Europe, which reflects on the state of the EU and identifies five different scenarios for the EU by 2025 (see Appendix 7). This document is particularly important, as it shows that the EU itself is uncertain about its very future.¹⁵⁵ The EU seems to recognize that for the first time in its history the very existence of the EU is being questioned, which necessitates change within the EU.

THE FIVE (SIX?) FUTURES OF EUROPE

The first of the five scenarios proposed by the Commission in its white paper was dubbed “Carrying On.” In this scenario, the EU will continue to exist and function as it has done since its creation. It will continue working in the same areas at the same rate of (relatively slow) progress.¹⁵⁶ While this was listed as an option, the fact that the EU now questions its future makes it seem as if simply carrying on is impossible and that change is necessary.

The second of the five scenarios is called “nothing but the single market.” As the name suggests, this path consists of dialing back or erasing all social or political areas the EU currently addresses. Instead, the EU will only focus on facilitating the single market

¹⁵⁵ European Commission. *White Paper on the Future of Europe: Reflections and Scenarios for the EU27 by 2025*. By Jean-Claude Juncker. Brussels, Belgium: European Commission, 2017.

¹⁵⁶ European Commission. *White Paper on the Future of Europe: Reflections and Scenarios for the EU27 by 2025*.

between member states.¹⁵⁷ This could decrease some of the political areas of tension, but it seems to give up on the historical vision of a unified Europe. While this may be the ideal option for some member states, it seems that the desire for integration is stronger in other member states, such that this option is seems unlikely.

The third scenario is one in which “those who want more do more.” In this situation, there is flexibility in what the EU facilitates for its member states. For more advance measures of integration, member states are free to opt in or to opt out as they so choose. Presumably, some member states will work for more advanced social or political policies, whereas other member nations will restrict their involvement in the EU to purely economic aspects. While it was not addressed in the white paper, many argue that this approach has indeed been a part of the EU all along, as member states have chosen to opt into agreements like the Euro and the Schengen agreement, but it is not universally mandated.¹⁵⁸ Perhaps this option would encourage flexibility in levels of integration more so than the EU has done historically, although it always has to an extent. This future seems to be one of the more feasible options largely due to the fact that flexible levels of integration have a historical basis in the EU, such that this option almost seems inevitable if the EU survives. The fear some states have for this option is that it would lead to “tiers” of members where not all member state are equal; however, because participation in each step of integration is up to each member state (as opposed to dictated by the EU), this does not seem to be a rational fear.¹⁵⁹

¹⁵⁷ European Commission. *White Paper on the Future of Europe: Reflections and Scenarios for the EU27 by 2025*.

¹⁵⁸ European Commission. *White Paper on the Future of Europe: Reflections and Scenarios for the EU27 by 2025*.

¹⁵⁹ European Commission. *White Paper on the Future of Europe: Reflections and Scenarios for the EU27 by 2025*.

The fourth scenario is one where the EU focuses on “doing less more efficiently.” In this scenario, the common standards are reduced, but efficiency and enforcement of the EU in the areas where does focus are improved.¹⁶⁰ This seems plausible, as it could increase the output legitimacy of the EU if it is able to have a visible impact by focusing on fewer areas with the same amount of resources. The difficulty in this option would on identifying the areas where the EU should focus and the areas from which the EU should step back.

The final option identified by the Commission is where the EU proceeds by “doing much more together.” In this future, all forms of integration increase to create a stronger and more efficient union.¹⁶¹ This option reflects the historical vision of the EU for a high level of integration and unity, although it seems unlikely given the resistance to the current level of integration.

Although it was not stated in the white paper (as doing so would be a nightmare from a publicity standpoint) a sixth possible future for Europe would be the dissolution of the EU. From interviews of EU officials, it seems that many acknowledge that the existence of the EU cannot be taken for granted as its existence truly is under question. The EU could be tipped toward this future based on the French election, Brexit, the global economy, or any number of factors. However, it seems that the true dissolution of the EU is unlikely. Even if the EU as it currently exists fails, it is plausible that a similar entity would take its place, such that there would still be some degree of European integration. This would presumably only include the countries that are largely in favor of the EU, such as Germany, to the point that it could have reduced conflict over the level of integration. Nonetheless,

¹⁶⁰ European Commission. *White Paper on the Future of Europe: Reflections and Scenarios for the EU27 by 2025*.

¹⁶¹ European Commission. *White Paper on the Future of Europe: Reflections and Scenarios for the EU27 by 2025*.

the dissolution of the EU as it stands today is largely considered a possibility that must be addressed.

While the future ahead is uncertain, a few things are clear. The first is the fact that the EU itself seems to recognize that its very existence cannot be taken for granted. The EU acknowledges that the path it is on today requires some form of change. The primary question is what changes should occur.

Through interviews of EU officials, it seems that those who are optimistic about the future of the EU generally view “doing much more together,” as the ideal; but, they recognize that it is unrealistic given the current climate. Instead, the best path for the EU from an optimistic viewpoint seems to be either allowing multiple levels of participation in line with the “those who want more do more” scenario (which arguably is the same as “carrying on”) or focusing on “doing less more efficiently.” It is worth noting that these options are not in contradiction, such that it is possible to do a combination of these two options. Those who are less optimistic about the future of the EU recognize that it has a chance of falling apart, and at best being just a single market.¹⁶² It seems difficult to imagine Europe without some form of integration, and many countries such as Germany still seem to value European integration; yet, the increase in Euroscepticism is undeniable. For this reason, it seems that the “those who want more do more” scenario is not only the most optimistic, but also the most probable.

To a significant degree, the future of the EU depends on events that are out of its direct control. Specifically, the future of the EU depends on the outcome of the French election, as Le Pen winning would be a genuine threat to the survival of the EU.

¹⁶² Interviews with EU officials, March 13-17, 2017. (see Appendix 6)

Additionally, the future of the EU depends on the outcome of the German election. While neither leading candidate would be a threat to the EU, Schulz would perhaps be more aggressive in pursuing integration, which could benefit the EU. Additionally, the future depends on the outcome of the Brexit negotiations. While the EU does have a say in how these negotiations continue, the final outcome is equally at the hands of the British. If Britain ultimately leaves the EU (as it appears it will) and Britain prospers, this could cause a domino effect where other member states will attempt to leave the EU; however, if Britain leaves and suffers hardships outside the EU, the chance of other states desiring to leave decreases. Additionally, there is a chance the negotiations never finish and Britain either remains or exists in a permanent state of limbo, which would also have complications. The future of the EU also depends on the global economy, as an economic downturn would almost certainly lead to increased opposition to the EU, as the people would perceive the ability of the EU to create economic prosperity as lacking. Finally, the future of the EU depends on the actions of Russia. If the Russian threat increases, then the EU member states will probably turn to each other to bolster their combined strength in opposition to Russia, which would potentially foster European integration through the EU. To a lesser degree, the increasing threat of China and the tension between Europe and the United States under President Trump could also have a similar effect of strengthening the EU due to a need to find strength in numbers.¹⁶³ While these events are largely out of the control of the EU, the EU can take steps to protect its future by resolving its input legitimacy and output legitimacy issues.

¹⁶³ Interviews with EU officials, March 13-17, 2017. (see Appendix 6)

RESOLVING THE LEGITIMACY CRISIS

While the future of the EU is impacted by factors outside of the direct control of the EU, the future of the EU primarily depends on the actions of the EU and its member states. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate what the EU can do to resolve its current crisis of input and output legitimacy (see Appendix 8), as the lack of legitimacy is the primary underlying reason for the recent rise in Euroscepticism. If the EU can sufficiently respond to its crisis in input legitimacy and output legitimacy, it can significantly bolster its support and improve its chances of survival.

CREATING OUTPUT LEGITIMACY

First, the EU needs to create output legitimacy, as output legitimacy is easier to create in the short-term than input legitimacy. The most visible way the EU can foster output legitimacy is by effectively responding to the three major issues confronting Europe. Specifically, the EU must take significant strides at promoting economic growth and stabilizing the debt crisis, responding to the refugee crisis and migration concerns, and effectively fighting terrorism. While the economy is subject to international market forces, the EU must do what it can to grow the European economy, create jobs, and improve the standards of living. As migration relating to the refugee crisis has been of top concern for member states, the EU must find a solution to decrease the migration flow into Europe and better respond to the concerns related to refugees once they have arrived in Europe. While the Turkey deal was a good start, the EU must do more so that the pressures of migration and immigration on its member states are relieved. Similarly, the EU must protect its border security and share intelligence within its intelligence communities to show that it can have an impact in fighting terrorism. In summary, the EU must effectively respond to

the three major issues confronting Europe, as this is important to restoring its actual level of output legitimacy. If the EU can manage to effectively respond to these issues, it is also necessary that the EU communicate its actions and its successes to the people so that it is also perceived as having output legitimacy—as actual and perceived output legitimacy are both necessary.¹⁶⁴

In addition to addressing these large issues, the EU must also have tangible impacts on the individual lives of European citizens. Its efforts to create tangible value for individual citizens must be relevant, enforced, and publicized. For example, the EU worked to pass legislation to reduce data roaming charges for Europeans visiting other EU member states, so it must work with member states to ensure that this legislation is enforced and must work with the member states to get credit for this positive impact on the lives of Europeans. This legislation is important first step, but ultimately the EU needs to find more areas where it can directly have an impact in the lives of the people. It will be insufficient for the EU to solely address tangible issues through legislation as it is imperative that the EU ultimately improves cooperation with member states to ensure that its attempts to create tangible value are realized through proper enforcement and publicized as EU initiatives.¹⁶⁵

CREATING INPUT LEGITIMACY

Simply creating output legitimacy is not enough to ensure the survival of the EU if its challenges with input legitimacy are not resolved. While the input legitimacy challenges will take longer to resolve than it will take to develop output legitimacy, the EU must still

¹⁶⁴ Interviews with EU officials, March 13-17, 2017. (see Appendix 6)

¹⁶⁵ Interviews with EU officials, March 13-17, 2017. (see Appendix 6)

work to address its three main input legitimacy issues of an unclear purpose, lack of a European identity, and detachment. In the long term, the EU will have great difficulty surviving if it lacks input legitimacy.

It is clear that the initial reason for the EU's existence, promoting peace through economic integration, has lost power as the memory of WWII has faded and a European war seems unimaginable to many. Unfortunately, the peace, prosperity, and stability the EU has fostered are not irreversible. The EU must find a new way to communicate the necessity of its existence to the people and the member state governments. While output legitimacy can and should be one source of justification, the EU must also craft a powerful and relevant narrative that can supplement peace as a reason for its existence. Many argue that simply appealing to the importance of solidarity may fill this void, but this argument seems insufficient to appeal to all people and nations. In fact, it seems that output legitimacy in combination with appealing to the value of solidarity is the best way to explain the purpose of the EU.

European citizens identify with their national identity before they identify as Europeans, and while they may not perceive the European identity as being in conflict with their national identity directly, the prioritization of national identities is still problematic for the EU. Over a long period of time with increased integration it might be possible to increase the strength of the European identity, this seems unlikely in the short term. Nonetheless, the EU must work to actively promote the strengthening of a single European identity, perhaps by having a common European history taught in schools.

As establishing the reason for the EU's existence and developing a European identity are difficult to achieve in the near future, the most important way the EU can foster input

legitimacy for itself in the short term is by correcting its perceived detachment from the people. The first aspect of its detachment is the source of democratic deficit, the idea that the EU doesn't actually represent the people it serves. While this is a problem, it seems that the people don't care about this particularly if the EU is able to create output legitimacy that the people value. The bigger problem for the sense of EU detachment is emotional, and the EU must show that it ultimately deserves the trust of Europeans and is in touch with their problems. This can be demonstrated by the actions the EU takes, as output legitimacy can ultimately foster input legitimacy if the EU makes tangible differences in the lives of the people that show the people that the EU genuinely understands their problems and is working to fix them. Of course, communication will also play a role, as the EU must get credit for the initiatives it creates and must communicate to the people that it genuinely tries to act in their best interest.

IMPROVING COMMUNICATION

Communication plays a key role in fostering the input and output legitimacy of the EU. The EU must be credited for its achievements in the eyes of the people in order to establish output legitimacy and communication is the key for ensuring this happens. Additionally, communication is important for establishing input legitimacy by publicizing the purpose of the EU, working to promote a European identity, and fostering a sense of connection between the EU and its people. Unfortunately, communication is currently failing in most every aspect. The EU has minimal forms of direct communication with the European people because the majority of communication is transmitted through national or local channels. Frequently national politicians take credit for the actions of the EU that align with national interests and blame the EU for actions that don't go along with national

interests but were politically necessary. This “blame game” has largely factored into the input legitimacy problems related to detachment, but also factor into output legitimacy as the EU doesn’t get credit for the actions it takes. While it is almost impossible for the EU to develop increased direct communication with Europeans because national and local channels have higher touch with citizens, the EU should work to do so to the limited degree it can. For example, the EU can take a more proactive and less responsive approach to media. Even more importantly, the EU must work with national government to improve the quality and accuracy of the communication citizens receive about the EU.¹⁶⁶ It seems that many national governments are beginning to realize that the “blame game” can be detrimental to them in the long term as motions to leave the EU gain strength, putting national leaders in a tough spot when they ultimately know that the EU is beneficial. It is imperative that national leaders step up and defend the EU, as ultimately they have more of a say in its future than the EU itself does.¹⁶⁷

HOPES FOR THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION

This paper has largely addressed the many shortcomings of the European Union that have led to its current existential crisis. The EU has very real problems with output legitimacy and input legitimacy, which is must correct. For the European Union to be a success, it must be efficiently create value for its citizens and respond to the major challenges Europe currently faces. Additionally, it must be better connected to its people and have a clearer purpose. Finally, promoting a stronger European identity would be beneficial at increasing solidarity and support for European integration. These are all very

¹⁶⁶ Interviews with EU officials, March 13-17, 2017. (see Appendix 6)

¹⁶⁷ Interviews with EU officials, March 13-17, 2017. (see Appendix 6)

significant flaws of the European Union that must be corrected; but, in spite of these flaws, the European Union is still incredibly valuable for Europe. European integration through the EU has contributed to unprecedented levels of peace, stability, and economic prosperity in the European subcontinent. In fact, the European Union received a Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 for its role in promoting “peace, reconciliation, democracy and human rights in Europe.”¹⁶⁸

Unfortunately, the EU has become a victim of its prior success as the strides the EU made towards promoting peace and advancing human rights are now taken for granted, causing the very existence of the EU to be called into question. Europe is at a crossroads and it is clear that the current trajectory of the EU needs to change; although it is unclear what changes will or should be made.

Europe must decide the future it desires, but there are compelling reasons why Europe should choose to continue striding forward with European integration.¹⁶⁹ If Europe chooses to abandon the idea of a European Union, its choice would potentially signify a turn towards a less peaceful and less prosperous future for Europe. Abandoning feelings of solidarity and increasing barriers to trade within Europe would likely lead to tensions between European countries that could go unchecked and spark conflict. Even without considering the potential for conflict, a Europe without the EU would risk a regression from the strides the EU has made toward advancing human rights and democracy within Europe, as some European countries are still working on establishing these values and would have

¹⁶⁸ Anonymous. "European Union receives Nobel Peace Prize 2012." EUROPA. Accessed April 29, 2017. https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/history/2010-today/2012/eu-nobel_en.


¹⁶⁹ Interviews with EU officials, March 13-17, 2017. (see Appendix 6)

minimal incentive to do so without the EU.¹⁷⁰ Finally, it seems likely that the global influence of Europe on international affairs would decrease substantially without the EU, given that no single European country rivals the economic or political power of global superpowers like the United States or China. Therefore, it is in the global political interest of Europe for the EU to prosper.

It is in the best interest of Europe that the European Union survives and continues to foster European integration. In spite of its many flaws, the European Union plays a significant role in promoting peace, democracy, and human rights within Europe and these values are worth defending. For these reasons, the European Union must improve its levels of input legitimacy and output legitimacy because the fate to the European Union depends on its ability to improve its legitimacy in the eyes of its people.

¹⁷⁰ Marthoz, Jean-Paul. "UN review of Hungary shows country 'treats human rights as a public enemy'" Committee to Protect Journalists. 2016. Accessed April 29, 2017. <https://cpj.org/blog/2016/05/un-review-of-hungary-shows-country-treats-human-ri.php>.

Appendix 1: Timeline of European Integration




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Appendix 2: Member States of the European Union



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Appendix 3: EU Institutions



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Appendix 4: EU Legislation and Budget Creation

How EU bodies work together




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Appendix 5: Cameron's EU Deal

Support for contents of Cameron's EU deal

Below are some of the changes proposed in the draft deal between Britain and the EU. In each case do you support or oppose the proposed change? %



YouGov | yougov.com

February 3-4, 2016

Dahlgreen, Will. "Draft EU deal gives boost to Leave campaign." February 4, 2016. Accessed April 08, 2017. <https://yougov.co.uk/news/2016/02/04/eu-referendum-leave-leads-nine/>.






Appendix 6: Interview Questions for EU Officials

1. Please describe your background and your work with the EU.
2. What do you think has contributed to the recent increase in Euroscepticism?
3. How do you think that the EU should respond to the issues you identified as contributing to Euroscepticism?
4. What do you view as the most probable future for Europe?
5. What do you think would be the best future for Europe?

These questions were used to interviews from 3/13/17-3/17/17 of 13 anonymous people who were closely associated with the European Union. Interviewees were connected to the European Commission, permanent representations of member states to the European Union, the European Parliament, the European External Action Service, and think tanks studying the European Union.


Appendix 7: The Five Futures of Europe

The five scenarios: policy overview

	 Carrying on	 Nothing but the single market	 Those who want more do more	 Doing less more efficiently	 Doing much more together
Single market & trade	Single market is strengthened, including in the energy and digital sectors; the EU27 pursues progressive trade agreements	Single market for goods and capital strengthened; standards continue to differ; free movement of people and services not fully guaranteed	As in "Carrying on", single market is strengthened and the EU27 pursues progressive trade agreements	Common standards set to a minimum but enforcement is strengthened in areas regulated at EU level; trade exclusively dealt with at EU level	Single market strengthened through harmonisation of standards and stronger enforcement; trade exclusively dealt with at EU level
Economic & Monetary Union	Incremental progress on improving the functioning of the euro area	Cooperation in the euro area is limited	As in "Carrying on" except for a group of countries who deepen cooperation in areas such as taxation and social standards	Several steps are taken to consolidate the euro area and ensure its stability; the EU27 does less in some parts of employment and social policy	Economic, financial and fiscal Union is achieved as envisioned in the report of the Five Presidents of June 2015
Schengen, migration & security	Cooperation in the management of external borders stepped up gradually; progress towards a common asylum system; improved coordination on security matters	No single migration or asylum policy; further coordination on security dealt with bilaterally; internal border controls are more systematic	As in "Carrying on" except for a group of countries who deepen cooperation on security and justice matters	Cooperation on border management, asylum policies and counter-terrorism matters are systematic	As in "Doing less more efficiently", cooperation on border management, asylum policies and counter-terrorism matters is systematic
Foreign policy & defence	Progress is made on speaking with one voice on foreign affairs; closer defence cooperation	Some foreign policy issues are increasingly dealt with bilaterally; defence cooperation remains as it is today	As in "Carrying on" except for a group of countries who deepen cooperation on defence, focusing on military coordination and joint equipment	The EU speaks with one voice on all foreign policy issues; a European Defence Union is created	As in "Doing less more efficiently", the EU speaks with one voice on all foreign policy issues; a European Defence Union is created
EU budget	Partly modernised to reflect the reform agenda agreed at 27	Refocused to finance essential functions needed for the single market	As in "Carrying on"; additional budgets are made available by some Member States for the areas where they decide to do more	Significantly redesigned to fit the new priorities agreed at the level of the EU27	Significantly modernised and increased, backed up by own resources; a euro area fiscal stabilisation function is operational
Capacity to deliver	Positive agenda for action yields concrete results; decision-making remains complex to grasp; capacity to deliver does not always match expectations	Decision-making may be easier to understand but capacity to act collectively is limited; issues of common concern often need to be solved bilaterally	As in "Carrying on", a positive agenda for action at 27 yields results; some groups achieve more together in certain domains; decision-making becomes more complex	Initial agreement on tasks to prioritise or give up is challenging; once in place, decision-making may be easier to understand; the EU acts quicker and more decisively where it has a greater role	Decision-making is faster and enforcement is stronger across the board; questions of accountability arise for some who feel that the EU has taken too much power away from the Member States

European Commission. *White Paper on the Future of Europe: Reflections and Scenarios for the EU27 by 2025*. By Jean-Claude Juncker. Brussels, Belgium: European Commission, 2017.

Appendix 8: The Input and Output Legitimacy Crisis of the EU



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